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Abstract 
When Conservative MPs took their seats on the opposition benches in 1997 the Party stood at a 
crossroads. The Party had spent eighteen years in government, relying on the successes of its neo-
liberal economic policies as a way to garner support. However, the rise of Tony Blair and New 
Labour’s adoption of Conservative policies appeared to mean that the Conservative Party had to 
'modernise' if it wanted to present itself as a government in waiting. This was not a simple task. 
Following the resignation of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 the party's factions grew further apart and 
more restless. Some on the right of the party wanted to stay true to the principles that had made them 
the dominant party of British politics in the 1980’s, others wanted to see the party pursue a modern set 
of policies. 
In this dissertation, I argue that throughout this period the term 'modernisation' was used by 
successive leaders of the Conservative Party as political rhetoric in an attempt to solve the internal 
divisions that had prevented the Party making ground on the successes of New Labour. The conflict 
brought into question the relationship the Parliamentary Party had with the membership with the 
reforms that resulted in Ian Duncan Smith’s victory in 2001. It was not until David Cameron assume 
the leadership in 2005 that there were successful strides towards modernising the Party. Up until the 
hiring of Lynton Crosby the political language and policies showed that Cameron prioritised social 
reform and wanted to break the perception that the Conservatives were the ‘nasty party’. This 
dissertation will examine the impact Cameron had in constructing the coalition programme and the 
reasons why Crosby forced Cameron to back down on modernisation and focus on economic issues 
and the promise of a European referendum. 
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Introduction 
The 2015 election campaign was expected to result in a hung parliament. The opinion polls, 
such as those published by independent pollsters such as YouGov,1 had suggested that the 
Conservative Party would hold the largest number of seats in the House of Commons but fall short of 
a majority of 326 seats by some margin. Yet as the night of 7 May progressed, it came to suggest that 
David Cameron would be the first Conservative leader since John Major in 1992 to lead the 
Conservatives to an election victory. 
The impact that the result of the 2015 election will have on the United Kingdom is yet to be 
clear. Cameron's leadership of the Conservative Party will be scrutinised heavily following the 
decision to leave the European Union in 2016. Critics such as the Labour Party and those within the 
remain campaign will argue that Cameron risked the national interest to benefit his standing in the 
party and this ultimately failed and that his arrogance would ultimately lead to his downfall.  Rather 
the focus of this discussion will be on the progression that the Conservative Party has made from the 
end of the turbulent Major years, which saw political infighting and weak leadership, due in part to 
the public perception that the government had lost its economic credibility. Furthermore, the 
Conservative government lost the trust of the public by pushing through a domestic agenda that 
punished groups of society, such as section 28 which became law in 1987, that prohibited the 
discussion of homosexuality in schools. Crucially this dissertation will aim to show the transition 
towards the centre ground by comparing these policies to those which followed the election of David 
Cameron to the leadership of the party. Policies that were based on the promise that he would pursue a 
more compassionate approach, moving away from the stigma that the Conservative Party was the 
‘nasty party’ that had above everything else not abandoned its free market principles. 
The leadership of David Cameron prior and during the coalition years has been considered a 
success: culturally, economically and politically by author Tim Bale in his book ‘from Thatcher to 
Cameron and by the pollsters who showed that Cameron enjoyed long periods ahead of Labour in the 
polls. This resulted in the development of policies such as the marriage equality act which was an 
attempt by Cameron to shift the ethos of the Conservative Party to a more modernised belief system, 
an attempt by the Chancellor to update the Conservatives economic policy to one based on fiscal 
responsibility, as these are factors that attributed to his success and winning the outright majority at 
the election 2015. Scholars such as Tim Bale suggest that under Cameron the party had transformed 
from a party that was ‘hopelessly detached from an electorate who were contented with new Labour 
                                                          
1 Wells, AŶthoŶǇ. ͞The ϮϬϭϬ EleĐtioŶ iŶ hiŶdsight͟ ϮϬϭϭ.  
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and its leader's style’.2 Yet during his leadership it is evident that Cameron became mired in problems 
that had previously undermined his predecessors. As a result, the language that the Conservative party 
used following the coalition government in 2010, such as the promise of an EU referendum, showed 
the Conservative Party making an apparent shift towards the right and reignites old flames that had 
caused the Conservative party to divide into factions, and ultimately lead to their demise in 1997. This 
led to the barren years, in which The Conservative Party can be considered a weak opposition, and 
failed to portray themselves as an effective alternative to Tony Blair. 
The outcome of the referendum that saw the British electorate vote for the United Kingdom to 
leave the European Union, it brought down the premiership of David Cameron because the Prime 
Minister believed that as a prominent remain politician throughout the campaign, he would be unable 
to complete his social and economic reforms whilst negotiation the country’s exit from the EU stating: 
‘I think it's right that this new prime minister takes the decision about when to trigger Article 50 and 
start the formal and legal process of leaving the EU.’3It is evident that following Cameron’s 
resignation, the language surrounding the issue of the UK’s exit from the EU suggests that it will be a 
complete split from the continental bloc. With Theresa May stating ‘Brexit means Brexit’ and Boris 
Johnson lauding the victory as Britain’s ‘Independence Day’. 
Throughout this dissertation there will be reference to Tim Bale’s published work on the 
Conservative party, most notably his book from Thatcher to Cameron.4 It provided an in-depth 
analysis to the inner turmoil that plagued the Conservative Party following Margaret Thatcher’s 
downfall in 1990. Bale’s argument is that the Party’s message was more important that the 
‘messenger’ and that this is evident due to high turnover of leaders in such a short period of time. This 
differs from the main argument of this dissertation that will demonstrate that the two were 
interdependent. An example of this would-be Ian Duncan Smith. His leadership can be deemed a 
failure because he struggled to engage the electorate with the Party’s message. It was not until 
Cameron, who was touted to be the ‘heir to Blair’ that there was an internal shift within the 
Conservatives that gave equal weight to the perception of the Party leader and its overall message. 
This idea is supported by other scholars such as Antony Seldon and Peter Snow who argue that 
Cameron was a master at political spin. Yet, due to the lack of the support from the media, most 
notably the broadsheet newspapers such as the Guardian and the Telegraph meant that Cameron 
could not effectively disseminate his ideas until after the hiring of his chief strategist Lynton Crosby. 
The impact of the media outlets will be examined throughout all of this period as the printed media 
                                                          
2 JeŶkiŶs, “iŵoŶ. ͞The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron by Tim Bale | Book Review.͟ The 
Guardian. 2010. 
3 CaŵeroŶ, Daǀid ͚Cameron announces his resignation͛ Telegraph. Ϯϰth June 2016. Pg.1. 
4 Bale Tiŵ. ͚Fƌoŵ ThatĐheƌ to CaŵeƌoŶ.͛ 2011. 
7 
 
provided intense scrutiny to the Conservative Party as it struggled to adapt to life on the opposition 
benches.  
The opening chapter will assess the impact John Major had on the growing divisions within the 
Conservative Party, analysing key decisions that he took throughout his premiership from Black 
Wednesday, leading up to the 1997 election campaign. The chapter will aim to build on the theory put 
forward by Tim Bale who argued that the failure of Major to refresh the themes on a smaller welfare 
state, a mixed economy that shifted the emphasis from the public sector towards the private sector and 
bring the party together on the issue of Europe. This coupled with the rise Tony Blair and his adoption 
of Conservative principles helped create an image that the Conservatives had become complacent 
whilst in government and this helped erode the public’s trust in the party. Tony Blair took inspiration 
from Bill Clinton’s policy the strategy of triangulation. ‘The term “triangulation,” politically 
speaking, dates back to the days after President Bill Clinton lost control of Congress in 1994’.5 This 
theory suggests that the governing party, both in the US and the UK presents itself as above or in 
between the political left and the political right. It will set the stage for the development of the idea 
that the Party’s core message could not be separate from the messenger, that the era of top-down party 
governance was over and it was the leader’s personality and the ability to spin the political message to 
the public that would ultimately see the Conservative Party return to power.  
Chapter Two will examine the impact of William Hague in bringing the Party together after the 
crushing electoral defeat, and the path towards modernisation. It will examine the impact internal 
reforms, such as the way in which the Party elected its leader, by giving the membership the 
opportunity to participate in the selection process. Hague’s policy decision will be examined to 
determine whether his true ambition was to modernise the Party or an attempt to rebrand the Party’s 
image in the media. The majority of the sources will derive from Newspapers and how Hague’s 
policies were presented to the public, and the extent the media played in forcing Hague to retreat to 
the Conservative base as the election grew nearer. 
Chapter three will consider the impact Ian Duncan Smith had on the path towards 
modernisation. It is easy to regard his time as leader as a complete failure because during his tenure as 
leader there was a growing divide between the Parliamentary Party and the membership. There will be 
an attempt to show that under his leadership there were small successes such as the local elections and 
a push towards modernisation with the party’s first openly gay member of parliament, for the 
Conservatives, and the first female chairperson of the party. In addition, Smith attempted to bring 
issues such as mental health to the forefront of the Conservative Party’s policies but ultimately failed 
in part to Smith’s lack of judgement; this meant he was unable to build on the successes that had been 
made under Hague and stood down after two years after giving his ultimatum to the party.   
                                                          
5 Bai, Matt. ͚Oďaŵa aŶd the QuestioŶ of ͚TƌiaŶgulatioŶ͛ -Website title: Nytimes.com. 2010.  
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Chapter four will critically analyse the decisions made by David Cameron in between the years 
2005-2008. This was the period in which it can be argued that the Party’s pursuit for modernisation 
was most achievable with publications being made on environmental issues and a focus on social 
issues which brought about the big society. Bale suggests that Cameron differed from his predecessors 
because he presented himself as an electable politician and the focus shifted from policies that 
appealed to the Conservative base to a strategy that helped develop the Conservative brand in areas 
that were considered Labour heartlands. 
Chapter five will address the circumstances in which Cameron took the Conservatives into 
coalition with the Liberal Democrats and attempt to pin point when Cameron’s attempt for 
modernisation ceased. This dissertation will reach the conclusion that the pursuit for modernisation 
stopped the moment the Party hired Lynton Crosby to be their chief strategist and this view is shared 
by authors such as Tim Bale, Antony Seldon and Peter Snowden. By referencing their work, it will 
become apparent that from 2013 onwards Cameron and his leadership team shifted the focus of their 
messages from social policy to the mess that they in inherited and how they had managed to steer the 
country away from an economic depression. The language points towards the Conservatives creating 
a sense of distrust amongst the public towards the major opposition party which helped Cameron lead 
the Party to its first majority government of the new millennia.  
The final chapter will assess the impact Cameron’s term in office, the transition from the 
opposition to government and the compromises he had to make in order to make his ideas a reality. 
The coalition programme set out the main objectives but it is evident that in the first few years the 
leadership lacked direction as they stumbled from policy to policy. The raising of tuition fees, to cuts 
to public services and division between the two governing parties, suggested that Cameron would be a 
one term Prime Minister. However, the hiring of Crosby shows the shift from a disorganised cabinet, 
to a well drilled political machine. The transition in language is also interesting as we see the 
transition towards a negative campaign where the core message attacked Labour’s lack of economic 
credibility and the prospect of a Labour-SNP coalition that would be five years of economic 
uncertainty which could not be risked after steering the country away from the recession. Cameron 
had prided himself on the gay marriage act but this was not a key point to the campaign, Crosby 
believed it would alienate the Conservative base as the passage of the bill saw major rebellions 
against the leadership from the parliamentary party and the activists.   
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Chapter One: John Major The road to disaster 
To start the examination into why the Conservative Party needed to modernise following 18 
years of government, the purpose of this chapter will be to analyse the impact of John Major on the 
Conservative Party as both the Prime Minister and as leader of a political party. The first event that 
determined the need for the Conservative Party to re-define itself occurred on 22 November 1990. 
Margaret Thatcher who had governed the United Kingdom for over a decade had resigned following 
the loss of support from members of her cabinet and a leadership challenge from Michael Heseltine. 
Thus, Margaret Thatcher endorsed John Major as her successor and was able to manipulate some 
support to ensure that she was succeeded by someone who would secure her legacy. Richard Vinen, 
supports this trail of thought arguing that Thatcher’s support for Major was down to various reasons 
such as the desire to ‘secure the survival of Thatcherism’6, although John Major himself contradict 
such claims by stating that he believed that the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher had 
excluded ‘so many minorities and those left outside the race for prosperity.’7 The language, of the new 
leader’s comments, suggests that John Major understood that he had to distance himself from his 
predecessor in order to secure his leadership and be able to convince the British electorate that his 
party was still the only credible option to govern the United Kingdom at the next election. 
Yet it is important to also consider that the need for modernisation also began on the 16th 
September 1992, commonly known as Black Wednesday and entrenched the leadership of John Major 
against the many factions that began to form within the Conservative Party, most notably the growing 
influence of the Eurosceptic action within the Conservative Party. Throughout the Thatcher era, the 
government had prided itself on its economic creditability, moving away from a state controlled 
economy in favour of a rebalanced economy that shifted economic policy from investment in the 
public sector towards the private. The consequences that Black Wednesday had on the Conservative 
Party was that, in opinion polls such as Gallup, the Party went from 43 percent to 29 percent of the 
vote, in the weeks following the government’s decision.8 This suggested that the Labour Party under 
John Smith had begun to present a strong alternative to the Conservative government and policies that 
seemed to offer hope in a time of economic uncertainty. 
Therefore, it is important to examine the extent John Major modernised the Conservative Party 
and the country when the British electorate went to the polls in 1997. With regards to his premiership, 
John Major had achieved some of his economic and social ambitions. By 1997, employment was 
rising, the deficit was under control and the British economy had stable growth. This meant that when 
the conservatives were elected out of office the new chancellor, as the Telegraph argues, 'inherited the 
                                                          
6 ViŶeŶ, ‘iĐhard. ThatĐher͛s BritaiŶ: The PolitiĐs aŶd “oĐial Upheaǀal of the Thatcher Era. 2010. 
7 Major, JohŶ ͚John Major the autobiography͛ ϮϬϬϬ, p.ϮϬϭ 
8 Hayton, R. (2012). Reconstructing conservatism?. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2012. P. 23. 
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most benign economic scenario for any British government'9. Yet, the economic successes of Major’s 
government did not result in electoral gains, the result saw a landslide victory for Tony Blair and New 
Labour. This can be attributed to several reasons. Throughout his leadership of the Labour Party Tony 
Blair, perception by the public was that he was a moderniser, as he had successfully re-written clause 
IV, which outlined the philosophical guidelines of the Labour Party and was part of the foundation on 
which the Labour Party in decades gone by had stood. It is argued that Tony Blair believed clause IV 
handed ‘ammunition to the enemy’10 as it had been misinterpreted by portion of the British electorate 
as a manifesto, which Labour, would take inspiration from if they went on to form a government in 
1997. This shift to the right by the Labour Party, which started under the leadership of Neil Kinnock, 
meant that they had learnt the lessons from the election in 1983 which had been considered the 
longest suicide note in history and that the new leadership of Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and Peter 
Mandelson knew that by moving towards the centre ground of politics they would be able to tempt 
away disaffected Conservative voters as well as appeal to Liberal voters and their own base. 
This rebranding by the Labour Party would play a major part in the Conservative Party’s need 
for modernisation during this period as Labour had tapped into the electorate’s belief that there should 
be investment and there be a compromise between issues such as social justice, economic growth and 
investment in the NHS. The 1996 budget, delivered by the chancellor Kenneth Clark, proposed that 
the Conservative Party was merely focused on economic growth, and reinforced the mantra that the 
Conservative believed that delivering economic stability was the main factor behind winning general 
elections.  The chancellor stated, ‘The lasting health of the British economy might win elections, that 
is true, but my first aim is the lasting health of the British economy’11. This economic message by the 
Conservatives in which they claimed that they were the only party who could be trusted to manage the 
country’s finances had been drilled into the British electorate since the general election of 1951, 
where the party had campaigned on the issue that under Labour the standard of living had decreased 
due to rationing and rebuilding Britain after the Second World War. ‘The attempt to impose a 
doctrinaire Socialism upon an Island which has grown great and famous by free enterprise has 
inflicted serious injury upon our strength and prosperity’.12 This repetitive economic argument, 
coupled with the rise of Tony Blair suggests the Labour Party had effectively ‘neutralised, at least 
until 2007, the classic conservative argument that Labour’s heart might have been in the right 
place…’13 However when reflecting on the 1996 budget in his memoirs John Major puts forward the 
idea that the Chancellor was not going to take any risks and that the budget had ‘disappointed those 
                                                          
9 OsďorŶe, Peter. ͚It͛s tiŵe to giǀe JohŶ Majoƌ the Đƌedit ǁe so ĐƌuellǇ deŶied hiŵ͛ Guardian. 2012. 
10  Sopel. J. "Tony Blair the moderniser" 1995. p.267 
11 Clarke, Kenneth ͚Teǆt of the ϭϵϵϲ Budget͛ 1996. 
12 ChurĐhill. W. ͚The ϭϵϱϭ CoŶseƌǀatiǀe MaŶifesto.͛ 1951. P.1  
13 Bale, Tim. The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. 2011.p.5 
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on our backbenches who were hoping for a pre-election bonanza’14, but it reinforced the healthy state 
of the economy. ‘Good economics is good politics’ remained the Chancellor’s mantra. However, 
when examining the Conservative Party's policies on other areas of government such as education and 
health it is apparent that the British electorate became detached from the government and believed 
such policies to be old fashioned. These policies will be examined in detail when looking at the 1997 
election and the rise of William Hague to the party leadership. 
Consequently, when analysing the impact of Major’s economics, it is apparent that he was 
unwilling to take economic risks. The exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 
September 1992 prompted a significant rebalancing of macroeconomic policy. Looser monetary 
policy – lower interest rates and a weaker exchange rate – was accompanied by a big fiscal tightening. 
Therefore, it is important to question why Major is considered a weak leader. Newspapers such as the 
Telegraph had played a crucial role in portraying John Major as a weak leader as they interpreted his 
leadership as lacking ‘personal presence, possessed an unbecoming petulance, and had no gift for 
language’.15 This comparison can be considered unfair when you contemplate that Major inherited a 
political party still trying to redefine itself after the Margaret Thatcher leadership in which it was clear 
who wielded all the power. This coupled with the silent modernisation which had been happening 
within the Labour party, which had resulted in the Labour Party moving away from their traditional 
policies to a political machine which appealed to traditional Conservative voters in middle England. 
However, it can be argued that Major was not as weak as the media portrayed him. He had survived a 
leadership challenge in 1995 and had been given a clear mandate to lead the party with 66 percent of 
the vote. Mainstream media like BBC argued that ‘Mr Major's victory represented support from two-
thirds of the parliamentary party - more than enough to win the contest outright in the first round.’16it 
can be inferred that Major was a strong political operative within the Party as he had managed to 
overturn the internal struggles that had plagued the Party following the removal of Margaret Thatcher 
in 1991. 
Therefore, the stage had been set for the election of 1997, the fiscal conservatives headed by a 
leader with a fresh mandate against a new Labour party aiming to break away from its ‘socialist’ past. 
The remainder of this chapter will focus on the impact the Conservative Party had in government 
regarding cultural changes, economic changes and the social changes to the United Kingdom, with 
policies that had been passed during their time in government. The major contributor to why the 
Conservative leadership began to highlight its successes in government was because the party had to 
convince enough of the electorate to allow them to form the next government, which it would not 
achieve until the general election of 2010. 
                                                          
14 Major, JohŶ ͚John Major - The Autobiography͛  2000, page 689  
15 OsďorŶe, Peter. ͚It͛s tiŵe to giǀe JohŶ Major the Đredit ǁe so ĐruellǇ deŶied hiŵ͛ GuardiaŶ. ϮϬϭϮ.p.1 
16 PolitiĐs ϵϳ. ͚Conservative Party Leadership Election 1995͛ ϭϵϵϳ. BBC oŶliŶe 
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The general election of 1997 pitted the record of a Conservative government, alongside the 
legacy of Thatcherism that had dominated the politics of the 1980’s, which claimed it had ‘created a 
better Britain’17 for all people in the UK. Against an alternative administration under Blair that 
claimed a vote for Labour would result in a government that would build on the successes made by 
the Conservative party over the past eighteen years, whilst presenting a united front to foreign affairs 
such as relations with Europe that had undermined Major’s government throughout his tenure as 
Prime Minister. 
One area that will be focused on throughout the period will be education. The Conservative 
Party in 1997 decided to build its policy on education around the success made under the Thatcher 
governments. John Major explained in the Conservative manifesto of 1997 that spending in education 
both at primary and secondary schools had increased during his premiership and that it was important 
‘to test children and publish the results’18 which allowed standards to be measured and exposed. The 
Conservatives had hoped to persuade parents that by publishing the results they would have a greater 
role in their children's education. The language defines the Conservatives education policy as based 
on competition, this shows that they had not manoeuvred away from the legacy of Thatcher and 
suggests that the party under Major had failed in attempts to modernise. This had a direct impact on 
the election because the way in which the party presented the facts surrounding their education policy 
reinforced the image that the Labour party portrayed. This was that the Conservative party was the 
nasty party and did not have the country’s best interests at heart, merely the desire to cling on to 
power, by representing narrow sections of society such as the middle class and business owners. 
 An example of this would be in the manifesto itself in which the party claimed that the lowest 
achieving schools were in Labour run local authorities. Even the language used in the Conservative 
manifesto suggests that the leadership did not understand the political shift within the British 
electorate. Sweeping statements about how education is every child's birth right and how it was 
essential for teachers to understand the importance of the tests in evaluating the child's performance 
over an academic year. The language that the Conservative and Labour parties had used in their 
manifestos and from their leader's speeches appear to highlight the contrast between the leadership 
styles of John Major and his opponent. Within the Labour manifesto, it talks about the rejection of 
monolithic comprehensive schools. It can be argued that statements such as this would resonate with 
the voters more as they set out the Labour party’s intentions and why they were choosing to move 
away from decisions made under consecutive Conservative administrations. Tony Blair did want to 
present a similar narrative in his manifesto, as the Conservative party's manifesto had to be lecturing 
the electorate about the importance of electing them to office and how they could build the moral 
                                                          
17 The CoŶserǀatiǀe PartǇ ͚You ĐaŶ oŶlǇ ďe suƌe ǁith the CoŶseƌǀatiǀes͛ 1997 foreward. P.1 
18 IBID p.5 
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society that they promised on the basis of neo-liberalism and policies that had foundation in the 
Margaret Thatcher governments of the 1980's. 
Another policy that reflects this idea that the party was entrenched in disputes amongst factions 
within the party was the Conservative party policy on Europe. As mentioned throughout this 
introduction on John major and his leadership the one issue that he struggled to unite his party on was 
on the UK's relationship within the European Union.  The manifesto claimed that the Conservative 
government had been at the forefront of ‘leadership in Europe, internationally on environmental 
issues,’19 however further examination of the Conservative manifesto shows to amalgamate the issue 
of Europe with events happening on the international stage. One can infer from this that the 
Conservative leadership did not want the electorate to focus on the European issue as it had played a 
major part in Conservative policies throughout John Major's leadership. The issue even resulted in 
John Redwood, a well-known euro-sceptic, receiving 20 percent of the vote in the 1995 leadership 
election. ‘In the event, the Prime Minister scored a convincing victory, polling 218 votes (66%) 
against Mr Redwood's 89 (27%)’20John Major even stated that ‘Just think it through from my 
perspective. You are the Prime Minister, with a majority of 18... Where do you think most of the 
poison is coming from? From the dispossessed and the never-possessed’21 This suggest that John 
Major knew that in order to achieve anything as Prime Minister, even have a chance of winning the 
1997 election he needed to shift the public eye from the disputes on Europe to his successes on 
foreign policy. The damage had been done by the years of infighting, which had been highlighted by 
the media. 
Therefore, the examination into the events that followed the fall of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 
to the landslide victory for Labour in 1997 there appears to suggest that the Conservative party paved 
the way for its own electoral humiliation. John Major had ascended to the leadership on the promises 
of moving away from authoritarian leadership of his predecessor. However, John Major failed to unite 
his party. Margaret Thatcher manoeuvred herself carefully during her early years as leader until the 
day came in which she could pursue her economic policies with a strong mandate from the British 
people. John Major on the other hand attempted to use his morality and differences from his 
predecessor to secure his leadership. Although John Major had electoral success in 1992 much to the 
surprise of the pundits and many within his party, the honeymoon period did not last long as events 
such as black Wednesday obliterated the argument that the Conservative party was the only political 
party that could be trusted with the British economy. It could even be argued that as a post war Prime 
minister John Major deserves some credit in stabilising the British economy after black Wednesday, 
policies that attempted to move away from the aggressive programmes of the past but politically much 
                                                          
19 IBID 
20 BBC PolitiĐs ϵϳ: ͚Conservative Party Leadership Election 1995͛ 1995. P.1 
21 BruŶsoŶ MiĐhael ͚Thƌee iŶ CaďiŶet aƌe Bastaƌds͛ iŶteƌǀieǁ ǁith JohŶ Majoƌ,͛ ϭϵϵϯ. 
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of his leadership of the Conservative party can be considered a failure. A divided party over Europe, 
disagreements between members of the cabinet and himself meant that that John Major was 
constantly entrenched fighting against member of his own party on many issues. The lasting impact of 
John Major's leadership was that it began an era in which the Conservative Party would sit in 
opposition with no real opportunity to oppose the Labour governments under Tony Blair until the 
election of 2005. Furthermore, it can be argued that John Major's leadership de-stabilised the position 
of leader of the party, as three leaders would be elected to the position of leader during the years 
1997-2005, not lasting longer than a few years until resigning due to the conflicts on major issues. 
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Chapter Two: New Leader: Fresh start or same old problems? 
The impact that the 1997 election would have on the Conservative Party cannot be under stated. 
As the Guardian stated, incoming Prime Minister Tony Blair had won a ‘Crushing Triumph’.22 The 
Conservative Party which now found itself on the opposition benches for the first time in eighteen 
years could only put up a mediocre resistance to the majority which had been won by Labour. The 
party started to search within itself and needed to project a new image to the British electorate. They 
turned to the youthful candidate of William Hague. The situation that the Conservatives had found 
themselves in following the 1997 election meant that Conservatives members were willing to support 
the idea of ‘skipping a generation’23.  Furthermore, Hague had positioned himself wisely over the 
course of the leadership election, appearing to be more compassionate than the Thatcher 
administrations but also sticking to key conservative principles on issues such as crime and the 
economy. One argument for this was that Hague ‘suffered from structural constraints that would limit 
his room for manoeuvre in the four years running up to the 2001 general election.’24 One example of 
Hague’s constraint is that Hague supported the minimum wage and supported the independence of the 
Bank of England after it became apparent that he could be challenged by other members of his party. 
The motives behind the reverse in Conservative policy was to cement his position as leader as his 
shadow cabinet became filled with members of parliament who were determined to modernise the 
party such as Michael Portilio who was portrayed as a potential successor to Hague if he did bring 
about reforms and electoral success. Furthermore, it was impossible to challenge a government that 
enjoyed a large majority in the House of Commons and would be seen as a weak opposition until the 
next general election. 
 This will be highlighted throughout the chapter as there will be an examination of some of the 
key decisions and policies taken throughout Hague’s leadership of the Conservative Party.  The 
leadership campaign highlighted the division amongst the party with fellow candidate John Redwood 
and his followers stating that, Hague was simply a ‘soulless careerist’25 whose arguments that the 
Conservative Party needed to modernise were merely an attempt to distract the party and the 
electorate from the ongoing issue of Europe that needed to be settled. Hague's problems began from 
the moment he took up his position, inheriting a party with several significant divisions and political 
agendas. The 'Fresh Start' policy attempted to unite the party once again ‘a new direction of policy 
which hands back to individuals and families the ability to shape their own lives’26by working 
together they could propel the party from its electoral obliteration to a position where it could regain 
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power at the next general election or build a foundation on which the Conservative Party could regain 
momentum in the 2001 election and later push on to win the 2005 election. Many MP’s and 
councillors felt that this was a bold statement to make, when it is considered that the Conservative 
Party had splintered in too many warring factions and would need to be unified to present to the 
public that they were fit to form the next government. Furthermore, polls suggested that the 
perception of Hague was that he would say anything to make himself electable, ‘The April 
Guardian/ICM poll published today shows that the Tory leader's personal support among 
Conservative voters has fallen 11 points since the end of March’27 so it shows that the Conservative 
party struggled to break the image that they were out of touch with what the electorate wanted. 
Nevertheless, they understood that the message the Conservative Party needed to get out to the 
public was that they had elected a new leader and he had already begun the process of unifying the 
party. This unifying process had been made easier due to the 1997 election because many Europhile 
members of parliament had lost their seat and thus were unable to undermine the new leader and his 
policies. This reinforces the idea that although the Conservative Party had wanted to move on from 
the troubles of the 1990’s it would be the same problems which would take up most the leader’s time 
throughout the Parliaments term. 
However, his leadership soon became subject to dissent after a publicity visit to a theme park 
with colleagues. This was an attempt by the Conservative leadership to show that he was in touch 
with the voters, although many, even within his own party saw the visit to the theme park as a pathetic 
attempt to seem young, leading to MPs suggesting that he was 'juvenile'. Furthermore, the visit 
became engraved on the minds of the British public due to Hague’s choice of headwear. The selection 
of the baseball cap appeared to present William Hague as awkward and out of touch, especially in 
comparison with the then Prime Minister Tony Blair who presented himself as a statesman in the 
political arena but as a Newcastle United loving fan when he was off duty. A subsequent visit to the 
Notting Hill Carnival, the biggest ethnic festival in Europe, was meant to show that the Conservative 
party was not just Oxbridge-educated Caucasians, but many commentators instead suggested that the 
visit brought this fact to public attention. Commentators such as the BBC highlighted that these 
publicity stunts merely glossed over the inner turmoil that was occurring within the party. ‘The 
incident did not mark the end of Mr Hague's honeymoon period as party leader, however, because 
there had never been much of a honeymoon period to end’28 Such conclusions appear to suggest that 
the leadership of William Hague would have followed the same pattern as his predecessor John Major 
unless he took action to unite a fiercely divided party. 
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Continuing, on from these attempts by Hague to reinvent the party the Conservative leadership 
in attempt to re-energise the party, decided to 'invest' £250,000 on a campaign called ‘Listening to 
Britain’ This policy was intended to rebuild the party internally focusing on ideals such as freedom 
and liberty, to understand why the party had been so heavily defeated at the polls but to develop ideas 
to the issues that the British public wanted to see their representatives prioritise. ‘Tory sources say Mr 
Hague is to be relaunched as a "normal guy who gets on with people likes children and enjoys 
relaxing with his wife’.29 It was a foundation to his speech at the 1998 Conservative convention in 
Bournemouth in which William Hague stated that if the Conservative Party was not in touch with the 
identity and values of the British people, then it ‘cannot be authentically Conservative.’ 30and that 
under his leadership the Conservative Party would be able to counter the third way of new Labour. 
The reason for this pursuit for modernization within the party was that Hague and his allies that 
‘conservatism appeared redundant or outmoded’31for Blair had managed during his tenure as leader of 
the Labour party to transition from policies that adhered to an era which had seen the left 
marginalized in politics by the policies of Margaret Thatcher and the tough policies that had reshaped 
Britain economically and socially.  
Labour had managed to combine ‘so much of the Conservative agenda’32 for example the issues 
of privatization and property ownership. This is evident in Blair’s first administration as Labour 
promised it would focus on education, setting up a minimum wage.  By focusing on issues such as 
these the Labour party managed to broaden its appeal to middle class voters, who had been 
traditionally conservative. Even the most ‘hard –headed estimate’33 suggested that the election would 
be at worse a 90-seat majority to Labour. This shows the extent to which a fresh leader was needed 
because the result showed how out of touch the Conservative Party and its central office with the 
electorate.  
William Hague was left in a position in which he needed to build on the successes of previous 
Conservative administrations but to reinvent the image. Margaret Thatcher had been a divisive leader 
throughout the country but had been admired for her no-nonsense approach to politics and world 
affairs. John Major had been perceived as a weak Prime Minister but won plaudits for how his 
administration had successfully steered the economy following Black Wednesday.  However, this 
presented a tough situation for Hague. The Party had not recovered from the leadership of John 
Major. The turbulence following the removal of Margaret Thatcher was still engraved in the party’s 
and the publics psyche. The philosophy of individualism which had been a corner stone to the 
philosophy of Thatcherism had impacted the Parliamentary Conservative Party by creating a sense of 
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loyalty only to one’s self rather than to the leader and the party. Over the course of seven years there 
had been three leadership elections and three different leaders of the conservative party between 
1990-1997. This coupled with statistics that showed that under Conservative governments there had 
been a rise in poverty within Britain. The millennium survey found that the economic restructuring of 
the 1980’s had led to ‘both widening inequality and rapid rises in poverty.’34 It can be inferred that 
publications such as these showed the political tightrope that Hague had found himself on. On the one 
hand, he had to show his colleagues in the parliamentary party that he was the right man to lead and 
on the other show the public that the party was transitioning away from the policies of the 1980’s 
which had seen the rise of inequality and poverty.  
This can be contrasted with previous Conservative leaders such as Heath and Baldwin managed 
to survive as leader following election defeat, due in part to the support they had from the Party’s 
grandee’s. The process in which the leader was selected changed dramatically over the course of the 
twentieth century. In the time of Baldwin, the party used and ‘uncodified process of consultation’35 
which meant that party elites discussed who would become leader and thus it was difficult to remove 
a leader from their position because they enjoyed the support of the Party establishment. It was the 
election of Edward Heath in 1965 that we see the Conservatives abandon the uncodified processes for 
a semi democratic system which oversaw a cultural revolution within the party and led to the 1998 
reforms which gave party members the chance to choose their leader. Although this was after the 
parliamentary party had decided which two candidates they felt should stand. For the new leader, this 
would have been seen as his number one priority as Hague would need to cement his position as 
leader if he was to have any chance of presenting an effective opposition to the Labour Party of Tony 
Blair. Hague would struggle to unite the party, in doing so he would revert to trying to strengthen his 
core vote through economic rhetoric and policies that focused on social justice and prison reform.  
Yet what is interesting about the policy of listening to Britain was that it tries to tackle too many 
problems and offers very few solutions. For example, as mentioned above Hague argued that if the 
Conservative Party did not identify with British values, then it cannot be authentically Conservative. 
One could question what did William Hague define as a conservative? The philosophical answer 
points to the idea that ‘Conservative prescriptions are based on what they regard as experience rather 
than reason; for them, the ideal and the practical are inseparable. Most commentators regard 
conservatism as a modern political philosophy, even though it exhibits the standpoint of paternalism or 
authority, rather than freedom’36.  
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 Furthermore, studying the political context of that statement over the course of the twentieth 
century the Conservative Party had evolved from one nation Conservatism to Free Market 
Conservatism. This is epitomised in the philosophy of Thatcherism which wanted to create an image 
that ‘the Thatcherite staff of conviction would be waved against the evils of consensus.’37  Even in his 
speech to the party conference William Hague comes out in favour of compassionate conservatism and 
idea that had been generated in the United States by the then Texas Governor George W. Bush. 
Compassionate Conservatism combines the philosophical creeds of one nation conservatism and neo-
liberal conservatism, ‘Conservatism must be the creed of hope. The creed that promotes social 
progress through individual change.’38 So, it is apparent that William Hague is using phrases such as 
compassionate conservatism to rebrand the Conservative image. Yet trying to define compassionate 
conservatism as the authentic strand of conservatism could have had a negative effect on his core vote. 
Listening to Britain would set the common trend for Hague’s leadership. For every initiative, 
programme and policy that Hague would put forward to the British people to move away from the 
nasty party politics of the Thatcher-Major era would ultimately fail because he was moving away from 
policies that had been adopted by the Labour government and much of the free world.  However, some 
sitting members of parliament believed that Hague was brave for bringing in these internal reforms. Sir 
Roger Gale stated that ‘William Hague was the right man at wrong time’39 and that if he had followed 
Ian Duncan Smith rather than preceded him as leader things might have been different for the 
Conservative party at the 2005 election.  The evidence in this chapter suggests that William Hague 
guided the metaphorical ship that was the Conservative Party back to calmer waters and could 
instigate reforms rather than be caught in the crossfire of the factions within the Conservative party.  
Moreover, the reforms put forward by Hague in terms of how the party selected its leader 
through one member one vote led to the election of Ian Duncan Smith as Hague’s successor. Internal 
changes made it easier for factions of the party to rally around candidates that they felt best 
represented their views. The winner of the leadership contest would then have a clear mandate to guide 
the party until the election. In this respect this policy of internal democratisation of the party can be 
seen as a foundation that helped propel the Conservative Party back to power in 2010 under David 
Cameron. Furthermore, it can be argued that by bringing in internal reforms Hague helped cement his 
own position as leader of the party and the reforms had a direct impact on the election of the next 
leader Ian Duncan Smith. 
As mentioned earlier the focus of the New Labour's 1997 election manifesto had been the 
importance the party had placed on social issues such as education and justice. The Conservatives had 
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appeared to be old fashioned sticking to the tried and tested means of the Thatcher governments 
policies of the 1980’s. The electorate had dismissed these ideas and it was up to William Hague to 
begin the process of developing policies that would appeal to his base voters. This comprised of: 
parents, victims of crime, and business leaders, whilst appealing to others such as: ethnic minorities, 
working class voters in the north, the devolved countries and certain parts of London, which were 
considered the traditional Labour voters. However, Tim Bale argues that the stresses of the leadership 
meant that by 1999 Hague had positioned himself so that he fought the government to a draw on 
‘traditional Labour issues’40 and focus the electorate on the issues that had worked for the party in the 
past. 
It can be argued that the reasons why William Hague decided to move the Conservative Party's 
focus from the economy to social matters was because: firstly, the Conservative party had always been 
the fiscally responsible party with an obsession with how the economy was being managed. Secondly 
that due to black Wednesday the Labour Party had spent the first few years in office, through the 
propaganda machine of Alastair Campbell, that the Conservative Party had left the new government 
with a ‘large structural fiscal deficit.’41 Therefore, to avoid being forced into a debate with Labour 
over the economy, as he knew it was a battle he could not win. A major contribution to this decision 
was that a new government, upon election, announces large number of reforms on different issues, 
however scholars such as Florence King argue that this is as illusion. That ‘innovations are often 
assemblages of existing programmes’42, thus Labour had managed to construct an economic message 
that they had accomplished to strengthen the economy, without highlighting that the decisions that the 
chancellor had taken upon assuming office were made on the basis of the strengthening economy he 
had inherited from the Conservative government. 
The Conservative Party's policy on education focused on the ideas that head teachers should 
have the freedom to manage their own school affairs, but also allow parents of students from failing 
schools to change management. ‘These reforms will lead to schools of the sort parents want - schools 
with high standards’. 43This shows that under William Hague there were still aspects of neo-liberal 
thinking when it came to education as taking away the power from the local authorities and giving it to 
the head teachers and parents would allow schools to flourish and develop. Rather than impose targets 
and other regulation to prevent teachers from developing the minds of students. However, when 
analysing this period, it is important to understand that the period a political party spends in opposition 
allows them to analyse the mistakes they made in government and build a new policy that attracts 
support. Issues such as education can see partisanship as political parties argue over who should 
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manage the school system. William Hague appears to have stuck to same hymn sheet as his 
predecessor John Major and that may have had a negative impact on his campaign. This change in 
political thinking and language highlights why the Conservative party would struggle to modernise in 
the years following their election defeat, for previous leaders such as Thatcher understood that in order 
to survive in opposition, a leader would need to adapt until they were in a strong enough position to 
weed out their internal opponents, an example being over the issue of privatisation in which Thatcher 
was only able to bring about because of her own landslide victory in 1983. In this respect Hague was 
given a blessing in disguise because the election had seen many MP’s who had differing opinions than 
the leader lost their seats. As a direct consequence Hague was able to the gather more support for his 
polices and was able to present to the electorate a more united party that the one who had been crushed 
in 1997. 
It is the same when it comes to William Hague's domestic policy, in what would later become 
the Conservative Party's manifesto for the 2001 election, William Hague promised to deliver more 
police officers on the streets, criminals to serve the sentence given to them by the courts and remove 
repeat young offenders of the streets. ‘Labour have talked tough on law and order but they have failed 
to deliver. Police numbers have fallen, and violent crime is on the rise’.44 This shift suggested that 
Hague had retreated to his political base once it became apparent that he would be unable to secure an 
outright majority at the next election. It can be argued that these policies would have been successful if 
William Hague was running in the 1980's or early 1990's. However, in the twenty-first century and 
after four years of New Labour, of which the Conservatives had emphasised that there had been a 
rehabilitation and pursuit of modernisation within the party. It can be argued that the public was not 
convinced by the progress that the Conservatives had claimed. William Hague may have started the 
process of modernisation within the Conservative Party, but had ultimately failed to break the public’s 
perception that the Conservative party was the nasty party of British politics. 
By retreating to the Conservative base, Hague had effectively given up on the idea that the 
Conservatives would form the next government in 2001. Consequently, Blair had taken up the centre 
ground politics and this ultimately undermined the Conservative policies under Hague. As mentioned 
earlier New Labour had created a golden economic legacy and this meant it was no longer considered 
a Conservative issue. The same could be argued with social issues such as crime, by being ‘tough on 
crime, tough on the causes of crime’ Blair had created a ‘winning formula’45 that would influence 
Home office thinking until the present day. The achievement of Blair and Brown to wrestle control of 
issues that had been previously thought as Conservative core issues, shows the extent of complacency 
the Conservative party had when in government. Hague had failed to modernise the language and 
policies of the party under his leadership and this was a major contributor to why he failed to 
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modernise the party whilst as leader. Furthermore, Jack Straw presented the case that statistics showed 
crime had fallen for the ‘first time since 1953’46 and this steady fall of crime during the Blair years 
would help strengthen Labour’s case that they should be elected to a second term in office. 
The final obstacle for the Conservatives during the period 1997-2001 was one that was entirely 
out of their control. Labour under Tony Blair had effectively governed and dismissed the theory that 
the Conservatives believed which was Labour could not govern without destroying the economy. 
Gordon Brown had managed to keep Britain out of the recession that had hit mainland Europe and 
Labour’s effective campaign strategy had dismissed the Conservative economic policy as a right wing 
and that if elected the Conservatives would make cuts in the public sector to help fund their planned 
tax cuts. This campaign reinforced the idea that Conservatives had not moved on from 1990’s despite 
all the rhetoric and media stunts. The same issues of Europe, immigration and tax had made the 
Conservative Party look like a sinking ship, and with a new captain and through effective strategy 
New Labour had managed to win a second general election in a row, something which had not been 
achieved since Harold Wilson in the 1960’s and showed the public’s shift in political thinking that 
they were willing to trust the Labour party with the governance of the UK. 
The election in 2001 brought an end to The Hague leadership and his legacy as leader will be 
one that can be examined in two ways. Firstly, William Hague had over seen a large reorganisation in 
the Conservative party, such as the ‘Fresh future reforms’47 which focused on bringing together the 
voluntary, parliamentary and professional aspects of the party together made it harder for the members 
of parliament to dispose the leader in attempt to bring stability to the party and provide continuity up 
until the election of 2001. However, if we examine the Hague leadership in terms of an effective 
opposition and its ability to articulate and persuade voters that they were a government in waiting. 
Then we can conclude that Hague was not a strong leader, he only added one seat in real terms to the 
Conservative Party in Parliament. One could postulate that this was due to advice given to William 
Hague, that when central office realised that they could not win a majority or win a substantial number 
of seats from the Labour Party because the ‘government continued to reap the benefits’48 of a healthy 
economy and thus were able to prove that to a larger proportion of the population that Labour was the 
best choice in the leading the nation for the next four years. This resulted in Hague and the 
Conservative party retreating to their base and the policies that they put forward in the 2001 election 
merely appealed to their core vote.  
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Chapter Three: The Fight between the membership and the Parliamentary Party  
Following the inability of the Conservative Party to make inroads into the Labour government’s 
majority at the general election of 2001. William Hague resigned as the leader of the party, with a 
leadership election being called under the new reforms that Hague had introduced during his tenure as 
leader. Five candidates stepped forward to run for leader: the former Chancellor Kenneth Clarke, 
Michael Portillo, who was a moderniser within the party arguing that the party should ‘be prepared to 
learn lessons from others’49in order to have a reasonable chance of reducing Labour’s majority at the 
next general election, David Davis, Michael Ancram and Ian Duncan Smith. Early in the leadership 
contest Portillo appeared to be the favourite, winning both the first and second ballot. Portillo argued 
for a ‘overhaul of party policy’50or face another humiliating defeat at the next election, this resonated 
with his Conservative colleagues as newspapers such as the Guardian published that Portillo had ’45 
public pledges. May creep to 50 in the first round.’51 However, one major flaw with the new reforms 
which Hague had introduced was that members of Parliament could tactically vote to present the 
Conservative membership with candidates that they wanted rather than for the candidate who was best 
suited for the role. When the party presented its candidates to the membership, Ian Duncan Smith and 
Kenneth Clarke it was noted that it would be a struggle for either man to unite the party and neither 
had the majority backing of the party’s Membership Elected. 
This chapter will examine whether Ian Duncan Smith inherited a party in turmoil, or if his 
inability to organise and control the party ultimately lead to his downfall. Tim Bale, Timothy Heppell 
and others offer a damning analysis of the leadership of Duncan Smith, stating that the period in which 
Duncan Smith lead the party had ‘descended into institutional chaos’52. The key argument that this 
chapter will present is that Duncan’s Smith’s ambition was to modernise the party, but he ultimately 
failed because he relied too heavily on a shadow cabinet that was he appointed mainly from the right 
of the party. Furthermore, that he lacked the desire and coherent approach to successfully achieve his 
ambition. Finally, this chapter will attempt to explain why there was a clear divide between the 
Conservative parliamentary party at Westminster, who opposed Duncan Smith at every possible 
opportunity and the Conservative base who elected him to the leadership with a clear majority and 
mandate. 
Ian Duncan Smith would win the leadership election by 55,000 votes but it was clear from the 
start that his inexperience would constantly undermine his leadership and ultimately led to his removal 
as leader just two years after being elected. Smith had served under Hague as the Party’s spokesperson 
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on defence and published the Conservative policies on the security and defence of the UK. He stated 
in 2001 that he believed a ‘strategic defence and security review’ 53 was needed and that this review 
would need to be led from the foreign office. It becomes apparent that from his published work. Smith 
presents an argument to the electorate that is based on facts and statistics. Stating that under New 
Labour defence spending had fallen by ‘2.4 per cent’54 which was the lowest level of spending by the 
department since the 1930’s.  This could be interpreted by the membership as a strength because 
Smith would be able to effectively break down the political spin and policy of Tony Blair and New 
Labour.  
Nevertheless, Ian Duncan Smith prior to his victory was still fixated on the idea of Europe. The 
idea that during the Tony Blair premiership, during the multiple summits that occurred over this period 
the Labour government appeared to be leading the UK to the creation of EU based army angered the 
new leader. Once again we note how the Conservative Party failed to get a grip on the idea of Europe 
because one the one side there was Ian Duncan Smith who would later campaign for the UK to leave 
the European Union in the referendum of 2016. Who was arguing that the defence policy was 
‘unrealistic’55 against Kenneth Clarke who had been noted throughout the 1990’s as a staunch 
supporter of being a member of the European Union. Ian Duncan Smith although effective at breaking 
down the facts and figures struggled to present himself as a passionate leader of the Conservative 
Party. His acceptance speech as leader showed the language of a man who cared about the electorate 
and wanted to use the Party as a means in which the electorate could get their opinions voiced in a 
parliament dominated by Labour. ‘The party I want to lead will be an effective opposition to this 
government. It will campaign on the issues that matter to people’56 however this language appeared to 
only appear to the core base as many considered the election of Ian Duncan smith to be an 
‘unmitigated disaster’57 and Blair and New Labour believed it was like ‘getting into a boxing a boxing 
ring and finding there was no opponent’58. This shows the extent to which Ian Duncan Smith was 
assumed as ineffective as leader of the party. Throughout the period as leader there appears to be two 
narratives. The first narrative is from the Conservative language. The idea that under William Hague 
the party had ‘given us firm foundations on which to build.’59 The language presents the idea that the 
party was ready to move forward and begin challenging labour party leading up to the election of 
2005. However, it is impossible to state whether people within the party believed this was achievable, 
especially under the leadership of Ian Duncan Smith. The second narrative as shown is the Labour 
narrative which was that the election of 2005 will be another huge majority for Labour as the 
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Conservative party could easily be portrayed to the public as weak and ineffective. The Conservative 
party had completely transformed from successful party of the 1980’s. Thatcher’s victory in 1979 was 
taken as a ‘marking a decisive shift in the national mood’60the party would completely redefine itself 
and create and effective government and election winning machine. This is a trend that is seen 
throughout the life of the Conservative Party. Even during the crisis of conservatism that saw the party 
banished to the opposition benches for the early part of the twentieth century. The Conservative party 
had always managed to fight back and between 1881-1990 the party had won ‘sixteen out of twenty-
eight general elections’61 no other political party could claim to have that similar record of success and 
it was easy to see why some believed that the Conservative party was the natural party of government 
of the UK. Yet under Ian Duncan Smith, this was not the case. The party looked exhausted after years 
of political infighting over issues such as Europe. The party lacked the charisma and organisation that 
had made the party and election winning machine and natural choice of government, like the party had 
been under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, Harold McMillan and Stanley Baldwin. 
So it can be easy to argue that the leadership of Ian Duncan Smith was a complete failure, but 
there were successes under his leadership. On 2 May 2002, 174 local authorities held local elections. 
The Conservatives won approximately 34 percent of the vote compared to Labour’s 32 percent and on 
average, ‘the turnout was higher than recent local elections at around 34 percent.’62 The party had 
managed to gain nine councils and an extra 238 councillors. This showed that Labour under Tony 
Blair could be defeated and that the Party could reduce the majority in the House of Commons. 
Furthermore, the internal structure of the Conservative party saw major advances under the leadership 
of Ian Duncan Smith. He appointed Theresa May, who would later become the Prime Minister in 
2016, as chairperson of the Party. The first female to ever hold the role and backed the first openly 
homosexual Conservative MP Alan Duncan. Such successes cannot be undermined as these 
advancements can be considered major advances in the modernisation of the party as the party had 
been portrayed as only serving a select few and by actively supporting the rise of politicians, which 
was due to their ability rather than their gender and sexual orientation.  
A year on from his election as leader of the party, Ian Duncan Smith addressed his party at the 
party’s conference. In his speech, which became notable for Ian Duncan Smith declaring himself the 
‘quiet man of politics’63. The speech focused on building the future of the UK on the successes of the 
past. ‘Millions more people own their own homes, but fear to walk down their own street’64statements 
such as these shows that the language within the Conservative party had not changed. The statement 
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focuses on that right to buy scheme which had been a huge success under the Thatcher governments 
was still a key policy of the Conservative Party but the fear of walking down the street is a statement 
that focuses to reassure their core vote that the Conservative Party is still the party of Law and Order 
and that they are the only party that can be trusted to ensure that people are safe when walking in their 
neighbourhoods. On the other hand, Ian Duncan Smith relinquished the idea that the Conservative 
Party was the only party that could successfully manage the nation’s finances when he states that 
Britain has a successful economy. This could have both positive and negative effects on the chances of 
lowering the Labour majority in the next election. It can be considered a positive idea because it would 
be near on impossible to convince the electorate that Labour could not be trusted with the economy 
when Tony Blair and Gordon Brown had overseen a period of growth and prosperity. Yet in one 
simple statement Ian Duncan Smith had handed a major election point over to his rival by accepting 
that New Labour had succeeded in steering the economy from the turmoil of the 1990’s. If Ian Duncan 
Smith had focused on the idea that between 1997-1999 Gordon Brown had committed himself to the 
same spending that had been ring fenced by the outgoing chancellor Kenneth Clarke, perhaps he 
would have had a greater impact on economic matters. The main failure of the speech was that the 
language appeared to criticise the party for taking the electorate for granted. It’s one thing stating that 
the party needed to rebuild but by criticising those who would be supporting him the next election it 
could have undermined his leadership.  
Bale presents the idea that Ian Duncan Smith lacked ‘individual judgement and his increasingly 
apparent inability to pursue a consistent strategy.’65 Thus, Ian Duncan Smith began to lose support 
from influential members of the old guard who were a gateway to the successes the party had achieved 
in the past. Within the Conservative Party, there has always been a link between the past and the 
present. During leadership elections, it was important to have the backing of those who had previously 
served or been prominent members of past Conservative administrations. In contrast to Labour who 
rarely relied on the old guard with the exceptions of Tony Benn. Michael Heseltine, who had served in 
multiple departments under Margaret Thatcher, led the charge to dethrone her and served as deputy 
Prime Minister under John Major, declared that the Conservative Party had not got a ‘ghost of a 
chance of winning the next general election’66 because during this period the Conservative had 
struggled to cut into Labour’s lead in the polls but had seen a rise in the polls by the liberal democrats 
who if the trend continued could have overtaken the Conservatives.  
This was an outrage to the rank and file of the Conservative party which had prided itself on 
being the most successful party in British politics. This forced Ian Duncan Smith to take action and 
gave the party an ultimatum ‘My message is simple and stark, unite or die’67. This infighting was the 
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representation of the Ian Duncan Smith leadership as it highlighted the lack of direction within the 
party. Ian Duncan Smith had tried to continue his predecessor’s idea of compassionate conservatism 
which had been a pillar to the success of the then U-S President George. Bush. Ian Duncan Smith had 
attempted to do this through publications and visits which focused on social issues, the economy and 
mental health. He appointed a full-time organiser to arrange an effective schedule so that he could tour 
around the country to meet people and to formulate policy. Throughout his leadership he visited 
‘police stations, drug rehabilitation centres, prisoner re-offending organisations, mental health 
charities’68This appointment was an attempt by Duncan Smith to organise his daily routine more 
effectively, which would mean he could focus on redefining the Conservative Party and move his 
agenda along so that he could prepare for the Party conference and later on a general election. 
Furthermore, Ian Duncan Smith attempted to rebrand the party and move on from the days of 
the nasty party. Which had led to demise of the previous three leaders. For example, on the issue of 
mental health Ian Duncan Smith and the party produced a report that outlined that ‘marital breakdown 
was the prime cause of children’s problems’69. This again reflects how the party could not fully 
understand what it meant to modernise. A political party does not simply modernise by simply 
introducing several internal reforms, but by appealing to sections of society that would not associate 
themselves with conservative values. This report highlights the need for a strong family unit, whilst 
highlighting the extent that party was divided along philosophical lines. Family values is closely 
associated with one nation conservatism but this undermined Ian Duncan Smith, for this report goes 
against much of his parliamentary party as over 60% of his MP’s associated themselves with Margaret 
Thatcher’s neo-liberal conservatism. Therefore, if Ian Duncan Smith wanted to pursue modernisation, 
he could have taken ideas from the man who opposed him at the dispatch box Tony Blair.  Who had 
spent his time in opposition developing policies based on the ideas of previous Labour leaders in John 
Smith and Neil Kinnock to create a new brand of socialism. This New Labour would be able to appeal 
not only to his core vote but to people who traditionally would have voted either for the Conservatives 
or the Liberal Democrats. Duncan Smith would need to take inspiration from his political opponent if 
he wanted to make the Conservative Party an electable force in British politics. 
By the summer of 2003, it appeared as if the leadership of Ian Duncan Smith was a target for 
internal threats determined to bring him down. One disaster after another continued to chisel down the 
support the leader had within the party. It was the leader himself who determined his own fate by 
stating that his critics should ‘put up or shut up’70 two days later 25 MPS presented the Chairman of 
the party a petition calling for the vote of no confidence and by 90 votes to 75 Ian Duncan Smith had 
been ousted as leader of the party. The reign of Ian Duncan Smith as leader highlighted a debate that 
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has recently been brought up during the leadership elections of Labour in both 2015 and 2016: does 
the parliamentary party have to adhere to the wishes of the membership? Ian Duncan Smith rose to the 
leadership due to the huge amount of support he had within the membership. Yet his entire tenure as 
leader had seen him undermined by the rank and file of those who were supposed to support him in 
Westminster. It is evident that a leader must have the support much of the party to have any chance to 
bring about change. Thatcher, Major, Hague and Ian Duncan Smith learnt this the hard way by being 
undermined by people within the parliamentary party. Ian Duncan Smith departed achieving no major 
changes to the party, the Conservative Party now embarked on their fourth leadership election in eight 
years and rather than a contest which many people expected. The Conservative party oversaw a 
coronation of a man who had been at the forefront of Conservative politics for over a decade and 
served four leaders. This man was Michael Howard and for the new leader it would be damage 
limitation rather than leading the party to victory in the general election of 2005. 
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The rise of David Cameron 2005- 2008 
Much of this dissertation has focused on the personality of the men who had been elected to the 
leadership of the Conservative Party. The reason this is the case is because the evidence suggests that 
the previous leaders believed in masking their philosophical beliefs in rebranded policies that offered 
no alternative to those that had been put forward by previous Conservative governments. The term 
modernisation is defined as the ‘process of adapting something to modern needs or habits’71previous 
leaders had failed in this ambition as they feared a backlash from the Conservative base, this is evident 
in the U-turns that had been taken by William Hague in the later days of his leadership. John Major 
with his back to basics Conservative polices and even in the early days of the Thatcher government 
when she was unwilling to risk her position by following monetarist policies. The purpose of the 
remaining chapters of this dissertation will argue that David Cameron developed policies, during his 
time as leader that differed from his predecessors in a variety of ways. First his personality differed 
from previous leaders because he was an effective communicator who used the media to present 
himself and the party as a government in waiting, secondly he changed the language of policies that 
showed a transition from previous Conservative polices. Cameron developed these skills whilst 
serving under Michael Howard, who manoeuvred reformers such as Cameron and Osborne to key 
positions within the shadow cabinet and guided the party into a position in which they could challenge 
New Labour after the 2005 election. 
In this respect, the leadership of Michael Howard can be considered a period of consolidation. 
For the party, had seen itself in opposition for eight years which was a remarkable feat considering 
that the Conservative Party throughout history had been viewed as an election winning machine, 
capable of regrouping after internal struggles to form strong and effective governments. These are 
apparent in the rise of Churchill during World War Two, the crisis of unemployment during Margaret 
Thatcher’s first term and the surprising success of John Major during the 1992 general election. 
However, the crisis that the Conservative Party faced at the start of the millennium was the greatest for 
a generation. Previous rifts had focused on free trade; and the concept of privatisation but by the end 
of the 2005 election cycle, it appeared that the new leadership contest would focus on old wounds. At 
the start it appeared that, David Davis, a staunch euro-sceptic, would take over with other notable 
names such as Liam Fox and Kenneth Clarke, a staunch pro-European, throwing their names into the 
contest. Some commentators noted that if Michael Howard had not resigned the weekend following 
the election he would have faced a leadership challenge as supporters of David Davis ‘were beginning 
to collect the signatures that would trigger a parliamentary vote of no-confidence.’72 This period of 
1997-2005 showed that the Conservative lacked a unifying figure who could recreate the past glories 
of the party. 
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The lack of control by the Conservative leaders during this period is reminiscent of Julius 
Caesar who appeared to wield all the power in the Roman Empire but was ultimately undone by a plot 
by his senators. ‘The influence of Julius Caesar was crucially important in this enterprise given the 
dictator was presented in humanist interpretations as both restorer of roman justice and triumphator.’73  
Consequently, Michael Howard proved to be a thorn in the side of David Davis deciding to prolong 
the leadership election to ensure that it would not be a coronation that he had overseen just two years 
earlier. The leadership election of 2005 epitomised the great divides within the conservative party. 
Liam Fox was the darling of the right, Kenneth Clarke the left and that left little room to negotiate a 
majority with over candidates in the race. Yet it was the upcoming star of the party, Shadow education 
secretary, David Cameron who would use this to his advantage. David Cameron offered the party a 
fresh perspective whilst not abandoning the value of the party. This was known as the ‘and theory of 
Conservatism’ or commonly known as Compassionate Conservatism. The idea that the Conservative 
party could stick to their traditional beliefs but still offer a broad appeal to the voters. Cameron offered 
to provide tax relief for millions of UK citizens whilst still investing in public services. Therefore, 
Conservatives in the UK had decided to follow the road that had been taken in the United States by 
George W Bush. However, one flaw with compassionate conservatism is that it appears to focus on 
helping people economically. Others such as Peter Murrell argue that compassionate conservatism 
does not focus on it as economics ‘social science, especially economics, does not centre its efforts on 
the processes of socio-economic change’74. This would be a challenge for the new leader to overcome 
as he would need to broaden the appeal of people who would traditionally not be seen as conservative 
voters most notably younger voters and voters in the Labour heartlands of the north, Scotland and 
Wales.  
David Cameron had promised at the conference to ‘build together a new generation of 
Conservatives. Let's switch a new generation on to Conservative ideas. Let's dream a new generation 
of Conservative dreams.’75from the off we can see the pragmatism of a man who had the opportunity 
to push on from the consolidation period and the dark days of 1997. The new leader accepted that the 
party needed to change used his speech to highlight how divided the party had come. ‘But let's not 
blame the electoral system. Let's not take comfort in solid but slow progress. Let's have the courage to 
say: they've failed - but so have we.’76 The acceptance that the party had failed would provide the 
platform on which David Cameron could cement his leadership. By highlighting that the division in a 
non-confrontational way, unlike Ian Duncan Smith, and focusing on it from the start David Cameron 
had sent a bold message not to his political opponents but to his party that if the Conservatives were to 
take its rightful place as the party of government in the United Kingdom the trivial arguments had to 
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stop. The new leader during his maiden speech offered the Conservatives something that the previous 
leaders had not and that was the ability to stand up and provide a significant opposition to Tony Blair 
and Gordon Brown. David Cameron’s ability to manipulate facts to suit his needs was equal to that of 
the Prime Minister. So one could infer that when David Cameron stated that the New Labour 
government which had sweep to power on the promise of making education accessible to all and to 
improve the standards of education for everyone, had created a system in which ‘16% means a pass, 
where parents of children in failing schools have no redress and no way out.’77he offered to his a party 
a way in which they could successfully challenge the government as well as weed out the internal 
problems.  
This transition played a key part to David Cameron’s strategy. The first major objective for 
David Cameron to break the public perception of the Conservative party and manoeuvre the party to 
the centre ground of the political spectrum. Polling data suggest that there were early successes for the 
new leader and his leadership team with polls suggesting that many voters considered David Cameron 
to be in the centre than his predecessor Michael Howard. YouGov in December showed that 32 
percent of those surveyed stated that the Conservatives were ‘more concerned for the interests of 
people’78.However, when compared to Tony Blair it was still an uphill battle. On the other hand, the 
same polling data offered an insight to the political future when the pollsters asked how David 
Cameron would fare up against Gordon Brown who had begun to shift the balance of power within the 
Labour Party with many postulating that Tony Blair’s days were numbered. The conclusion was that 
‘figures suggest that the Brown vs Cameron contest will be seen as left vs right.’79This is a testament 
to how successful Tony Blair had been in the dominance of the centre ground politics. Consequently, 
although the figures showed that the Conservatives had begun to transition to the centre ground it 
would be some time before they could claim it for themselves and start to show, through policies that 
they had modernised and become attuned to what society wanted.  
This transition to the centre ground meant focusing on policy areas that the Conservative party 
had sometimes neglected. No longer would the party just focus on the Tebbit trinity80 of Taxes, 
immigration and Europe. But focus on issues such as social policy, and highlight the successes of their 
economic policy as an economic rethink was never at the forefront of the Cameron leadership as the 
party believed that ‘Thatcher's economic interventions as one of her greatest successes’81 but social 
policy was one area that the Conservative party could exploit. Rather than allow a misconstrued 
argument that ‘there is no such thing as society’82 David Cameron wanted to break the public image 
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that the Conservatives were hostile to public services, did not care for the disadvantaged or those who 
were living in society and create a narrative in which society could buy into and help create. Cameron 
argued that ‘I now think of the ultimate responsibility a prime minister has to make sure our public 
services are properly funded.’83 This subtle step in the first months gave weight to the argument that 
David Cameron had made in his maiden speech as leader. Which was that under his leadership the 
Conservatives would not go through the same rebranding exercises that they had done under previous 
leaders that this was in fact a philosophical and political shift that would present the party as the party 
of government rather than as the so called nasty party of Margaret Thatcher.  
The first area that the transition towards modernisation began with the policy towards social 
justice. In his early days as leader, David Cameron set up the Centre for Social Justice, chaired by the 
former leader Ian Duncan Smith, with the pretext to advise the new leadership team on how best they 
could tackle social issues. The reports varied from education to the breakdown of families and it is 
apparent that all reports adhere to traditional Conservative beliefs whilst constructing a policy that 
would appeal to millions of disadvantaged voters. One example, which was published in 2006 focused 
on education. The report argued that the ‘country is proud of its status as one of the best educators in 
the world. Our ancient and modern universities continue to attract the brightest and the best from 
across the globe while our unique approach has long been admired internationally.’84 However, under 
the consecutive New Labour administrations the focus had been that the policy of ‘Education 
conducted in the media has concerned exam results. This paper focuses upon those who do not make 
the column inches. Government targets, such as the numbers attaining 5 A*- C at GCSE and gaining 
university entrance, ignore our country’s most disadvantaged pupils.’85 The think tank put forward the 
idea that the government through the media was merely highlighting the average success within 
schools not looking at ways in which they could help improve the standards of education for those 
who were in lower bands of attainment. A report shows the early stages of modernisation within the 
Conservative Party in a philosophical sense. It was Margaret Thatcher and her government who 
introduced the Education Act of 1988 which created the national curriculum and league tables to 
Britain, eighteen years later that Conservative party under David Cameron was looking at ways that 
they could create a fairer education system that stopped focusing on those who succeeded at school but 
rather to create an inclusive system that allows every child to succeed.  
The report symbolises the importance of the compassionate conservatism theory to the new 
leadership. As aforementioned the theory compassionate conservatism focuses on traditional values 
and seeks to combine them with modern day society. The report on education highlights success made 
by previous conservative leaders dating back to the nineteenth century and argues that this is an area 
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that should be considered a ‘natural tory ground.’ 86This highlights the renewed conviction of the 
Conservative party to win back the voters by highlighting that they were the party who had always 
prioritised education reform from acts such as the Factory Act of 1833 which guaranteed better 
working conditions for poor children who had been working in factories and provided children with 
two hours of schooling a week. ‘What made the 1833 Act so important was that it established a system 
to ensure that regulations were enforced.’87 That the main objective for the party during the first few 
years under David Cameron should be to recapture the reforming spirit that had been so successful in 
the past. These small decisions made in the early days of his leadership showed that David Cameron 
was wholeheartedly committed to modernisation whilst he was leader of the opposition. For in his first 
few months he had achieved more in the pursuit for modernisations that the previous two leaders. The 
report into education concludes that the education system was not well designed and is unaware or 
unable to turnaround the under achievement that takes place in the schools of the UK. Of course, the 
report highlights the political aspect that New Labour had put all their efforts into driving up standards 
whilst forgetting those who struggle and are disadvantaged by the system. The report suggests that the 
Conservative policy should focus more on highlighting the children who are struggling and 
incorporating parents into the decision making and help influence their child whilst they are in 
education, rather than adopting the approach of New Labour which was to throw money at the 
situation and adopt a one size fits all mentality. This rhetoric would be crucial to the election 
campaigns in 2010 and 2015 when Lynton Crosby forced the Conservative leadership to accept that 
this was the best course of action to ensure that they would lead the party back into government. 
This theme is continued in speeches, in the media and in political advertisements. David 
Cameron wanted to put out to the British people the core of the Conservative Party Values was that 
they were built to last. Cameron describes this approach, referencing the political past in Thatcher, by 
stating,  
“The more we trust people, the stronger they and society become. We are all in this together… we have 
a shared responsibility for our shared future… There is such a thing as society; it is just not the same 
thing as the state. We will stand up for the victims of state failure and ensure that social justice and 
economic opportunity are achieved by empowering people and communities.88 
When examining the language, one notices the conviction David Cameron puts into the speech. He 
uses language as way to build a bridge between the party at Westminster to the average voter across 
the country the idea that together the country can achieve great things. The problem however is that 
many political commentators have expressed outright hostility to the idea of Cameron’s compassionate 
conservatism. Some such as the political commentators Mark Steyn and Simon Heffer see the theory 
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as ‘deeply flawed’89 and that it is simply rhetoric aimed at covering up the political rebranding that 
was taking place under Cameron. The problem for David Cameron is that during his speeches he does 
not explain what the contrast is between the state and society and how does he develop policies that 
tackle the challenges that the country is facing. This would undermine David Cameron throughout his 
leadership even up to his resignation following the EU referendum and led to some criticising his 
leadership as crisis to crisis management. However, in his early speeches David Cameron focuses on 
addressing two issues that had distanced the average voter from those who sat in Westminster. David 
Cameron highlighted the growing distrust between voter and government and how he and the 
Conservative Party were going to keep the country safe in the war on Terror which had been 
announced by President Bush following the attacks on 11September 2001. The voter now no longer 
prioritised the economy rather focused on how the government was going to keep them safe, there had 
been anger at the Tony Blair’s argument that Saddam Hussein’s Iraq posed a threat to Britain’s 
national security. This had an impact on the way people saw the UK-US special relationship with 
voter dissatisfaction that he had taken the country to war in Iraq over apparent weapons of mass 
destruction that had still not been found. It is argued that the road to war was based on ‘measured 
analysis of the threat, on the conviction that the continued containment of Iraq through sanctions was 
not effective or morally acceptable’90 but fresh studies such as the Chilcot Inquiry show that the 
‘severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were presented with a certainty 
that was not justified.’91 
However, David Cameron was experiencing a slump at the polls by the end of 2006. Many 
voters did not see him as a Prime Minister in waiting and that he ‘remains marginally ahead of Tony 
Blair on the best leader question, his approval ratings have dropped markedly – down to +2 from +14 
the last time YouGov asked the question in April.’92 This shows that his message was not getting 
through. The party was struggling to show the voter that the Conservative Party was changing under 
his leadership. This reinforces the idea that there was a lack of trust between the voter and the political 
establishment and that the party had still not managed to break the image of being the nasty party. One 
can infer this to be the case because David Cameron was up against a Prime Minister who had his 
lowest approval ratings, recording levels last seen during the poll tax riots under Margaret Thatcher. 
Yet David Cameron could still not pull away in the polls. With pollsters remarking that other parties 
such as the Liberal Democrats being out of touch with the voter. Conservative grandees such as Lord 
Tebbit stated that the new leader had not impressed some within their core vote and this was worrying 
as it could result in many staying at home. This showed a distrust within the party as lord Tebbit 
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disapproved of Cameron’s ‘reforming agenda’.93  This was a defining time for the new leader as this 
was the best chance for the Conservative leader to drag his party into twenty first century and 
cemented his place as leader.  
By 2007 the Conservative Party had not yet developed a modern perspective on Foreign policy. 
David Cameron had criticised the New Labour government for having an ‘international community’94 
doctrine which had been used to justify previous interventions in Iraq, Sierra Leone and Kosovo. 
David Cameron wanted to adopt, or suggested that he preferred a more isolationist approach as 
Foreign policy deals with handling international security matters in the national interest. Ensuring that 
all citizens are safe and that the country had sustainable trade deals with other nations. However, as 
Clarke argues, ‘Ideology is always difficult to translate into action, and foreign policy is an area that 
time and again blunts ideological fervour in favour of a more cautious pragmatism.’95 Furthermore, 
David Cameron had been overwhelmed by the effectiveness of Gordon Brown on foreign policy ‘For 
the Conservative leadership under David Cameron, Brown's forays into foreign policy provide little 
room for manoeuvre, especially in areas such as humanitarian intervention and the Anglo-American 
relationship’96 this can be interpreted in two ways. First it can be inferred that even if the 
Conservatives were to win a snap general election, or an election later they would be committed to 
foreign commitments made by the Brown administration. This mirrored the situation New Labour 
faced when they won their electoral landslide in 1997, with Gordon Brown committing the 
government to the two years of spending that the Conservatives had outlined in the 1996 budget. 
Furthermore, the New Labour government under Tony Blair had controversially allied itself with the 
American administration of George Bush and the Conservatives under David Cameron would not have 
wanted to undermine the Anglo-American special relationship over a few commitments on the 
international stage. Secondly, it can be inferred that David Cameron could not seize the initiative on 
foreign policy because Gordon Brown had managed to present himself as an effective leader on this 
issue.  
Looking forward it is interesting to note that after leading the Conservatives into coalition in 
2010 it is thought-provoking that David Cameron distanced himself from his foreign policy of 
isolation and preferred to engage British forces in the Libya crisis and pushed for action in Syria. In a 
speech in parliament Cameron stated ‘Britain has been at the forefront of the military operation to 
protect the Libyan people’97 Thus, showing that with regards to foreign policy it is a matter for the 
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governing party to act in the national interest rather than to enforcing their political dogma on the 
international stage. Although external factors such as the special relationship with the United States 
and with other European nations such as France would have been strained if Cameron had not 
intervened in the conflict. Furthermore, by not engaging with diplomatic allies would undermine his 
attempts to negotiate with Brussels. Both crises that David Cameron would face during his 
premiership and the EU referendum would receive major criticisms from all sides of the political 
spectrum and would later undermine the public’s perception of David Cameron and would ultimately 
lead to his resignation. 
By 2007, the Conservative party had struggled to build momentum following Tony Blair’s 
announcement that he would resign the premiership and as leader of the Labour Party to be replaced 
by the Chancellor Gordon Brown after his coronation in the 2007 leadership election where he ran 
unopposed. The chancellor lacked the same charisma and composure as his predecessor and it 
appeared as if the Conservatives could seize the initiative that only they under David Cameron could 
form the next government. However, opinion polls suggested that the Conservatives only had a minor 
lead and at some points were behind Labour. ‘Things stalled for the Conservatives when Gordon 
Brown became prime minister and by the end of September they had been forced down to 31% in two 
polls - MORI and Populus/Times (both sampled between 20-27 September).’98 Brown had managed to 
present himself as a clear break from Blair and that appealed to some voters who had become 
disillusioned by the former Prime Minister’s decision since coming to office in 1997. It became 
apparent to the Conservative leadership that they needed to highlight the changes they had made in 
little over two years since David Cameron became leader and the conference could not have come at a 
better time. After spending the opening minutes comparing the government of Gordon Brown to that 
of the Soviet Union, the Conservative leader became to roll off the changes he had asked the party to 
make when he took the stage asking Conservative members to back his leadership bid. ‘Today just one 
in 10 of our members of Parliament are women but almost a third of our candidates are women. I 
didn't do that; you did that and you should be proud of what you've done.’99 The importance of 
highlighting that the party was addressing gender inequality within the party was a political move to 
combat the criticism that the Conservative was a dominantly white, middle aged male party and that 
by including more women on the candidates list they would be able to broaden their appeal especially 
to female entrepreneurs, mothers and young women at university.  
Furthermore, David Cameron highlighted that the Conservative Party had successfully 
campaigned on the environment which did not solely mean climate change. Cameron highlighted that 
the only way that the UK was to meet its Kyoto promise of reducing carbon emissions by eight percent 
by 2012 was to introduce ‘three elements to a responsible environment policy: government leadership, 
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tax-based incentives, and market solutions.’100 This became a cornerstone in Cameron’s attempt to 
modernise the party prior to leading the Conservatives into coalition in 2010. No leader prior to 
Cameron had put so much emphasis into a coherent environment policy. Stating not only was creating 
a sustainable government needed to ensure that the UK needed to reduce carbon emissions but that 
climate change was an issue that should resonate with voters personally because the younger 
generation would have to live with the consequences if the government did not act now. Green 
policies would be an important part to David Cameron’s election manifesto in 2010 stating, ‘A 
Conservative government will cut carbon emissions and rebuild our energy security. We will make it 
easier for people to go green, with incentives for people to do the right thing.'101  
This is not the only area in which the language coming from the leadership changed, during the 
party conference Osborne announced that he would reduce two taxes. The shadow chancellor 
announced that he would be tripling the threshold of inheritance tax from £300,000 to £1,000,000. The 
response from the media was that this was a positive move that repositioned the Conservatives as the 
party of lower taxes, it also took ‘nine million families from having to pay death duties.’102 It can be 
argued that this political manoeuvre by the Conservatives prevented Prime Minister Brown from 
calling a snap general election. Similarly, policy changes such as the one on inheritance tax reinforces 
the idea that the Conservative had modelled itself on its American counterpart as the Republican party 
was the party of tax cuts and the party of families. In this respect, it can be argued that the ambition of 
the leadership was to rebrand itself based on the successes the Republican Party had made at the start 
of the millennium, rather than an intrinsic desire by Conservative lawmakers to develop a modern 
belief system that the electorate could rally behind and support. 
This pragmatic approach shows the political insight to the Conservative leader. The 
Conservative Party had been transitioning over the course of this period, to a liberal-conservative 
approach. They did this by combining liberal ideas such as those on green issues whilst providing 
economic incentives to businesses and families. This would secure the Conservative core voters as it 
shows that they were still committed to representing the interests of business but shows the transition 
from the party of old. The last manifesto of the Thatcher government dedicated its environment policy 
to the growing importance of nuclear energy. ‘We intend to go on playing a leading role in the task of 
developing abundant, low-cost supplies of nuclear electricity, and managing the associated waste 
products.’103 Although the neo-liberal Conservative approach noted that, it would not be sustainable to 
rely on fossil fuels they failed to realise two major factors. First, the government provided funding to 
scientific research but did not offer the voter incentives to lead a greener lifestyle and secondly the 
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government failed to produce a second plan if nuclear energy could not produce as abundantly as the 
government had hoped. 
Political commentators, such as Neil Carter, note that the issue on the environment had been 
neglected by both parties prior to David Cameron election as leader. Some argue that David Cameron 
had created an ‘intense party political competition’104 over the issue. In some respects, this is true, 
during most election cycles issues such as the economy, law and order, foreign policy and defence sit 
at the forefront of voter’s mind as they want to protect their interests whether it be their families, jobs, 
savings and freedom. Following an election issues such as the environment took a greater role in 
government thinking because political parties were more susceptible to environmental pressure 
groups. This translated in events such as Cameron’s trip to the artic, this was a ploy developed by 
Frank Luntz during the 2005 leadership election and adopted by Cameron throughout his leadership. 
Luntz ‘had organised a focus group of potential Conservative voters, clips of the five candidates 
speaking in public were presented to the audience and David Cameron got the most favourable 
response.’105Luntz had managed to take Cameron’s weaknesses and turned them into strengths such as 
his lack experience compared to his challengers and this managed to convince a room full of voters 
that he was the best choice. Therefore, by highlighting issues such as the environment, Cameron was 
able to shift the public’s attention away from the message of New Labour and focus it on issues that 
the public had become interested in.  
This is also seen in the issue of devolution. The Conservative Party had opposed devolution in 
1999, and had not truly embraced the idea until the election of David Cameron. The party had 
struggled in both Wales and Scotland. Devolved elections in 2007 provided the opportunity for the 
Conservative Party to challenge the notion that they did not take any interest in the matters of the 
Scottish and Welsh people. The 2007 Scottish Conservative manifesto promised to ‘We’d also expect 
local authorities to consider allocating budgets to community councils. Scotland has hundreds of 
flourishing community councils, and it makes sense to help them to act in the best interests of their 
fellow residents.’106 This renewed focus on issues outside of Westminster could be a political 
masterstroke or disaster. The Conservatives had not presented an effective challenge in the devolved 
countries since the days when Margaret Thatcher had resided in Number 10. Since then the 
Conservatives had seen the share of the vote decrease, particularly in Scotland. David Cameron was 
targeting the Labour electoral heartlands and if he could make a significant dent or improve on 
previous elections it could be considered a success. The results of the 2007 Scottish election backfired 
on the Conservative leader with a loss of one seat in the parliament. It was the Scottish National Party 
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who had managed to derail the Labour dominance and this would be the case all the way up to the 
devolved elections in 2016 in which the Conservatives would remerge as the official opposition in the 
Scottish Parliament. Up to now the pursuit of modernisation appears to be more of a political 
manoeuvre, rather than an internal passion from the leader to pursue policies that benefit the national 
interest. This is a constant criticism that is thrown at David Cameron and his leadership team 
throughout his time as leader that he is only acting to enhance his political capital rather than acting in 
the nation’s interest.   
However, it can be argued that by pursuing more centrist policies in an attempt to modernise his 
party, it was not as easy as the leader had hoped in 2007. Fears that Gordon Brown could call a snap 
general election, forced David Cameron to reaffirm his core vote and as a direct consequence the issue 
of the environment became far less important when compared to the issue of law and order. 
Furthermore, figures on the right of his party such as Douglas Carswell and Mark Reckless had 
defected to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) and this presented the first real internal 
problem for David Cameron and his leadership team. Conservative leaders following John Major had 
constantly been undermined by the political party, with in some cases blatant attempts by back 
benchers to create a motion of no confidence. Cameron had managed so far in his first two years to 
steer the Conservative ship slowly towards the centre ground. With external factors, such as the 
resignation of Tony Blair making the political shift more appealing to the party.  
Conversely, defections from the party showed that David Cameron had to balance the needs of 
his party, his core vote and his aspirations to achieve this end goal. By 2007 it is apparent that 
although the party had modernised in some areas it still appeared to the electorate as nothing more 
then a rebranding. One member of parliament stated that under David Cameron the party ‘ceased 
collectively to believe in anything, or to stand for anything’107so this presents a picture that David 
Cameron had manipulated the party through smoke screening and failed to present to the party and 
people anything of substance that would make voters question the direction that New Labour had 
taken the country in their ten years of governance.  In 2008 David Cameron, would have to convince 
his party, the nation and his critics that the shift towards the centre was essential if the Conservative 
party was to effectively modernise and be able to secure enough support to form the next government. 
One can postulate if Gordon Brown had called an early general election in 2007. David Cameron 
pursuit for modernisation would have failed and all his attempts would have been for nothing.  
When reflecting on the first two years of David Cameron’s leadership it is evident that there had 
been several significant positive changes that suggested to the electorate that the Conservative Party 
was ready to emerge from opposition and form a strong and effective government. Cameron had 
successfully managed to steer his party from the right of the political spectrum towards the centre 
                                                          
107 BBC. ͚CoŶserǀatiǀe MP defeĐts to Laďouƌ͛ 2007. 
40 
 
ground whilst consolidating his leadership. In this respect, he was a more successful leader than any of 
the previous leaders following the election landslide in 1997. Consequently David Cameron ensured 
that in the majority of his speeches he showed that under his leadership the Conservative would be 
committed to modernisation by first focusing on issues that previous Conservative leaders had 
neglected but by also taking the fight to the Labour government, which during the period 2005-2007 
had become mired with political infighting between supporters of Tony Blair and those of Gordon 
Brown which mirrored the political infighting that been seen in the Conservative Party following the 
downfall of Margaret Thatcher all the way up to the election of David Cameron.  
However, it is important to note that all the successes that David Cameron had achieved in this 
period had not all been engineered by him. There was some political fortune with the failure of 
Gordon Brown to call an early election when opinion polls suggested that he would keep a Labour 
majority. This would result in the next three years, until the election of 2010, a re-energised 
Conservative Party pursuing more modern policies and a continual shift to the centre. Yet it was one 
major event that occurred in 2008 that would enable to Conservatives to seize back that traditional 
issue that had been the foundation to so many of the Conservative Party’s electoral successes and that 
was the economy. The party machine had masterminded the theory that the economic crash in 2008 
had been in part due to the over spending of the Labour government. This accusation would 
undermine Labour’s economic policies right up to the election of 2015. The Guardian argued that the 
economic downturn was ‘a banking crisis pure and simple’108 but the Conservative would entrust 
Lynton Crosby to drive home the message that the Labour party could not be trusted with the 
economy.  
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Chapter Five: Cameron’s push for Modernisation and Victory: 2008-2015 
It is at this point that it will be argued that Cameron began to abandon his pursuit for 
modernisation. The activists did not want to focus on issues that were trivial when unemployment and 
debt were rising. Cameron needed to revert to the philosophy of neo-liberalism to safeguard his 
position as leader. The main factor had been due to the economic crash; however, from a political 
perspective Cameron could not alienate those outside of Parliament. Conservative Party headquarters 
gained more oversight and control under his leadership this included control over local authorities, 
party groups and this created distrust between Conservative headquarters, the leadership and local 
associations. This affected his leadership later on, as Cameron was unable to grasp the severity of this 
internal policy that it would undermine his authority as he sought a second mandate at the 2015 
general election. 
By 2009, it is evident that previous Conservative leaders had not prioritized modernisation 
because they would have struggled to persuade their membership and the electorate that it would be a 
worthwhile endeavour. Tim Bale suggests that this was due to the leaders ‘upsetting an increasingly 
Thatcherite parliamentary party’109 who would argue that the party should continue the policies that 
had the party successful during the 1980's rather than pursue modernisation. Furthermore, Bale argues 
that prior to Cameron the Conservative party had prioritised short-term gains and adhering to the same 
ideological beliefs that had made them the dominant political force in the twentieth century. The idea 
that the party needed to give the electorate what they supposedly needed rather than what the 
electorate said they wanted. Bale's argument focuses on two major issues that had undermined the 
Conservative party until the election of Cameron in 2005. First was the party's fixation with Tony 
Blair. Many Conservatives, along with Cameron and Osborne, admired the way he had engineered the 
1997 election to inflict a damaging defeat on a party who had become complacent over eighteen years 
of governance. Many within the party considered Blair to be a master of political manoeuvring. 
Therefore, if the Conservatives wanted to be successful under David Cameron, they would have to 
adapt and accept that traditional Conservative policies would not guarantee electoral success. 
Secondly, the impact the media had on the political environment. Previous leaders had tried to avoid 
criticism from the media and this would an area in which Cameron would have to tackle head on if he 
wanted push the party towards modernisation. 
Cameron leading up to the election of 2010 reminded Antony Seldon and Peter Snowden of 
Stanley Baldwin. Cameron was not a darling of the press; during the leadership campaign of 2005, 
Cameron ‘did not have the support of a single broadsheet paper’110 the right-wing tabloids would not 
entirely back Cameron until 2013. A criticism of Cameron that has followed him throughout his 
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leadership was that he was reluctant to handle problems until the last minute. One issue was that he 
preferred short-term answers on Europe. During his leadership election, he had promised to pull the 
Conservative Party out of the EPP group within the European parliament. Cameron stated that the EEP 
group held ‘federalist views which were at odds with Tory policy.’111 Such promises had helped him 
secure victory but after 2005 he made little headway until promising a referendum on the UK's 
European membership in 2013 that can be argued was due to the gains UKIP had been making over 
the previous years and the successes they had in by-elections, Local election and in the European 
elections.  
The image Cameron had portrayed was one of arrogance. He had committed himself to a 
detoxification of the Conservative brand upon his election in 2005 to abandon this pledge during the 
economic recession that took place in 2008.  One area in which David Cameron focused his attention 
on what he called the 'big society', which at his heart saw a reinvented role for the state. ‘I also want to 
argue that the re-imagined state should not stop at creating opportunities for people to take control of 
their lives. It must actively help people take advantage of this new freedom.’112 With speeches like this 
Cameron reinforces Bales argument as he is producing speeches, policies and think tanks that look at 
issues that do not focus on traditional Conservative argument. However, Bale argues that when the 
moment came Cameron was able to reposition himself as a traditional Conservative once the economic 
crash happened, speeches like those which focus on the big society which became a key policy under 
his leadership argue against Bale's idea. There is a link between the failure of Cameron and his 
leadership team to unite the newspapers behind his new brand of Conservatism. The Institute of 
Economic Affairs and the media both attacked Cameron’s big society initiative stating, ‘This Big 
Society initiative is full of promising rhetoric, but still seems to be based largely on bigger 
government, not a bigger role for individuals.’113 
The big society is an initiative that would continue after Cameron would form the coalition with 
the Liberal Democrats in 2010. However, Cameron avoided a political disaster with opposition to the 
big society being disjointed and sporadic. The left struggled to provide an alternative to the big 
society; Unison argued that it was a way for the Conservative party to justify their economic policy of 
austerity, which would bring the country finances under control. Unison officials argued that they 
must ‘beat this big society nonsense.’114Labour argued it was an attempt by Cameron and his team to 
present Labour policies that had already been legislated through the House of Commons as new 
Conservative ideas. Finally, Mark Littlewood from the Institute of Economic Affairs argued that this 
was a way to explain a bigger role for the government and not empowering local people. The Institute 
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of Economic Affairs looked at analysing ‘how the tax system can best raise the necessary funds for 
government expenditure without distorting the market.’115This fixation on the expenditure and deficits 
would become a major campaign point for the Conservatives, for the golden economic legacy that 
Labour had prided itself on had collapsed following the economic crash in 2008.  
Cameron would have the perfect opportunity to put to the electorate all the promises and 
commitments he had made during his tenure as leader in 2010. This election would focus on an issue 
that for decades had been considered a cornerstone too many conservative electoral successes the 
economy. It was important for Cameron to make this election about the successes he had made as 
leader and what direction he would take the country if he had the opportunity to serve as Prime 
Minister. Cameron would also have to stress how his government would fix the economic crisis that 
had occurred under the stewardship of Labour. The Conservative propaganda machine would have to 
produce rhetoric and policy to persuade the electorate that this was all down to Labour's economic 
policy. Cameron understood the importance of undermining Labour on their economic policies. It was 
important for the Conservatives to stick to their message that Labour was responsible for the economic 
crash. The language of the criticism needed to combine the economic crash with Labour’s 
overspending. However, Gordon Brown questioned the Conservative narrative stating that his 
intervention show that he had acted wisely in securing the banking sector which prevented Britain 
falling of what experts called the fiscal cliff. Gordon Brown believed that the banks ‘were deluding 
themselves that the problems would just disappear.’116with confidence in the banks decreasing and the 
fear of an economic crash Gordon Brown supported the tough decision of his chancellor to 
renationalise some of the banks. 
The 2010 manifesto gave the perfect opportunity for Cameron to put all his rhetoric and 
political manoeuvring towards modernisation into practice. The foreword brought together the 
political past with the present, as there was a ‘mood afoot that the decline of Britain was inevitable’117 
Thatcher had won the election of 1979 by providing Britain an alternative to the consensus politics 
that had followed the Second World War. Yet in 2010, the political parties had all positioned 
themselves in the centre ground. The leaders of the three major political parties all claimed that their 
polices were radical and the only solution to the downturn the occurred due to banking crisis. Upon 
examining the manifesto, it is apparent that David Cameron places a high emphasis on the economy, 
which is not surprising because previous Conservative administrations had prided themselves on the 
management of the economy. David Cameron's vision blended this area of government with others, 
using the economy as a springboard on which his government would fight social problems and rather 
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than giving families and individuals a hand out in benefits, they wanted to provide a hand up and 
create jobs.  
The language of the manifesto highlighted the economic turmoil in the country. By 2010, the 
public service debt had tripled to £952 million when compared the debt Labour took over when they 
won in 1997. ‘After a painful and turbulent decade under the Tories, the public finances had finally 
been brought under control. But after four years in office Gordon Brown took out the country's credit 
card and let rip’118 This painted the picture that Labour had lost its way and that Gordon Brown had 
forsaken his 'golden rule' and overseen an economic downturn that was like the great depression in the 
1930's. Cameron stressed to the electorate that this would require a collective effort; it was important 
to reduce the amount the government spent and increase the governments revenue. Once the budget 
returned to a surplus, Cameron would be able to tackle the nation’s debt. During the campaign 
Cameron argued that there was an ‘absence of a credible plan to deal with our record budget deficit’119 
Cameron's economic strategy placed the importance of making savings in the government 
departments and then placing strict restrictions on the public sector. By making the tough decisions on 
the economy, Cameron would then be able to shrink the size of government, which had been a 
touchstone to many right-wing candidates across the globe. 
 
The second aspect that would ensure that Cameron would secure a majority and form a new 
government would come down to campaigning. Cameron's rhetoric had showed that during his 
leadership he had tried to portray an image that the party had abandoned its traditional policies and 
favoured modernisation. Cameron understood that he would need to attract voters that would not 
commonly align with the party such as ethnic voters and working class families. A study by national 
council for voluntary organisations found that the 2010 election had ushered in a new form of 
campaigning. ‘This new environment compels us as campaigners to rethink our strategies so they can 
engage with new and emerging policy agendas.’120 Yet the argument that Snowden and Sheldon put 
forward that Cameron would become a crisis Prime Minister is evident in the campaigning of 2010. 
Cameron's hard-line approach to wasteful spending in the government departments meant that when 
his leadership team assumed their ministerial profiles it would be political fight for the Departments to 
ensure that the Treasury would not demand enormous spending cuts to their Departments.  
 
Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, the electorate had changed so much that some analysis, 
like that carried out by Stephen Jirvaj, looked into the last conservative victory in 1992 and showed 
that John Major would not have won a majority if he ran the same campaign in 2010. In the ten years 
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between 1991-2001 there had been a 2 percent increase in people who identified as non-white. ‘Mixed 
ethnic groups have grown faster than most other ethnic minority groups. The African ethnic group 
doubled in size during the 2000s to almost a million.’121 This dissertation does not assume that all 
people who associated themselves with the Labour party but the perception of the Conservative party 
under Major was that it was out of touch and did not care for those who were on the lower end of the 
economic ladder. Therefore, it is possible to postulate that if the 1992 election had been rerun in 2010 
Major would have lost. This lack of support by ethnic voters could have provided Cameron with the 
opportunity to show the British public and media, who had not yet endorsed Cameron, that the 
Conservative Party had modernised under his leadership. Encompassing groups of society that did not 
previously associate their political views with the Conservatives. However, it is evident that Cameron 
and his leadership team failed to utilise the campaign to convince non-white voters that the party had 
changed. Cameron needed to focus his efforts on areas that ‘The Conservative Party had historically 
struggled.’122 This research by British Future, provided mix results, it showed after the election, 
Cameron did make some ground gaining votes there was still a substantial ethnic gap and lack of 
appeal. Statistics showed, Cameron gained 36 percent of the vote nationwide but only 16 percent of 
that came from non-white voters. The research argued that it was the perception of the Conservative 
Party that persuaded non-white voters to cast their ballot for other parties. This supports the idea Bale 
put forward that the Conservatives’ had struggled to break away from the image that had been 
portrayed in the dying days of the Thatcher government and the political infighting that dogged down 
the Major premiership. It can be argued that Cameron would have to use his time in government to 
persuade ethnic voters to cast the ballot for the Conservative Party. Some opinion polls suggested that 
if Cameron could successfully bridge the ethnic gap they would enjoy a twelve-seat majority in the 
election of 2015.  
 
The methodology of the research by British Future had both strengths and weaknesses. The 
major strength of the research was that it highlighted the extent to which Cameron had struggled to 
influence the political landscape in the devolved countries, as there were few Labour-Conservative 
marginal seats so much of the research focused on constituencies in England. It used the 1992 and 
2011 census to show the electorate had changed over the decades. However, the research does not 
consider the impact of Cameron's perception and performance in the media. The 2010 election was 
the first to televise debates between the leaders of the three main parties. At the time, it was noted 
how this could benefit smaller parties like the Liberal Democrats as they had the opportunity to argue 
their policies on the national stage. 
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The electoral vote for the 2010 election showed that the Conservative vote rose by 5 percentage 
points but translated to a net gain of one seats in the House of Commons. This led to some parties 
most notably the Liberal Democrats calling for the voting system being changed from first past the 
post to proportional representation. Although they had risen to become the largest party the 
Conservatives had failed to win an outright majority and where faced with two credible options. The 
first option appeared to the most likely which was David Cameron forming a minority government 
tasked with pushing through a Queens speech, the risk of forming a minority government was that it 
dared the other parties in parliament to defy the speech and a subsequent return to the polls. However, 
it would have crossed Cameron’s mind that if had successfully pushed through a Queens's speech and 
could successfully legislate policies Cameron could call a snap election and benefit from his risk. The 
second option was to form a coalition government, which would have become the first peacetime 
coalition government since the 1930’s. The major problem for Cameron was that there were major 
ideological differences between the Conservative Party and the other parties. It has been argued that 
the deal, which was reached between the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives, saw that ‘in global 
terms we find that the agreement is nearer to the Liberal Democrats’123 but when it came to domestic 
policies, it favoured the more centre right approach put forward by the Conservatives. 
 
The twenty-first century from a political perspective was determined by two international 
events. The first was the terrorist attacks that took place in New York in September 2001. It forced 
western governments to acknowledge a new threat from radical Islamic militants. President Bush 
stated in his address to the nation ‘These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into 
chaos and retreat’124 by 2010, the UK was fighting two wars and becoming deeply concerned with the 
growing unrest and instability within the Middle East and Africa. The coalition agreement prevented 
Cameron from pursuing a more isolationist approach to international affairs and as his first term as 
Prime Minister progressed he pushed for intervention in Libya and Syria and began to pursue a more 
ideological foreign policy. The second factor that had dictated the political scene was the expansion of 
globalisation, the integration of markets had overseen developments in technology and the ability to 
trade freely opened large markets to the UK. Cameron entrusted Osborne to focus on the development 
of UK-Chinese relations hoping to bring about a ‘golden decade’125 in economic investment.  
 
Therefore, international factors helped define the discussions that took place between the 
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats. Consequently, it was the parties’ manifestos that could 
have prevented the formation of the coalition government. As mentioned there were enormous 
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ideological differences between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats, with many liberal 
democrat activists preferring discussions taking place between Nick Clegg and Gordon Brown. It 
confirmed the trend that ‘Britain had returned to multi-party politics’126 the agreement was spun as 
‘historic document in British politics’127 that it was important to put the national interest before 
ideological differences. The agreement cemented the idea that under Cameron the days of big 
government were over and that under his leadership there would be a policy that oversaw the 
distribution power to local authorities and people to help create a ‘more fair and responsible 
society.’128 Cameron had developed an image that the Conservative Party was willing to share power 
if it was in the national interest. It can be inferred that Cameron would have preferred to govern alone 
but decisions like the coalition agreement showed that Cameron was willing to adapt to bring about 
change. His adaptability shows the extent he was willing to modernise the Conservative Party and 
British politics. Thatcher argued when she was the leader of the Conservative Party ‘what great cause 
would have been fought and won under the banner: ‘I stand for consensus?’129 It was her ability to 
stand by her decisions during her later years as Prime Minster, regardless of the consequences, that 
earned the respect of her colleagues on all sides of the house, this ultimately led to her downfall once 
she refused to back down over the poll tax. Cameron showed that he was willing to move away from 
this idea when he opened dialogue with the Liberal Democrats, it was better to have a Conservative 
led government in Cameron’s eyes then to bring about months of uncertainty. This is another way 
Cameron had modernised, it has been noted that it was important for Cameron to break the perception 
that the Conservatives were the nasty party in British politics. Cameron wanted to change the 
perspective internally that the party and the leader were separate cogs in a machine. That they 
complemented each other and when needed worked with each other to bring about policy. Cameron 
wanted a strict structure that would make the Conservative Party a force to reckon with in British 
politics again.   
 
The coalition document delved into all areas of government and society with comments on 
issues from banking, business, and culture to Europe. The document provides a unique opportunity to 
examine the extent that both parties were willing to compromise but also the opportunity to see how 
far the Conservative party had come since the landslide victory for Labour in 1997. The chapter on 
banking was heavily influenced by events that had preceded the election in 2010. Cameron and Clegg 
understood that their coalition had to be strong on bonuses that were being received by people who 
worked in the financial sector as well as build a strong foundation from which the UK economy could 
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grow and create new jobs. Yet the chapter also focuses on issues such as ‘competition issues’130 which 
would see the introduction of a level playing field between big retail companies and small. It is 
important not to devalue the importance of policies such as this because prior leader of the 
Conservative Party had always stood by the philosophy of competition, especially in the business 
sector. The 2010 policy allowed small businesses to have similar opportunities to their larger 
counterparts when it came to local government drawing up plans to shape the direction of their retail 
development. When coupled with the policy that aimed to award 25 percent of government contracts 
to small or medium sized businesses. Cameron was putting into practice policy that reinforced his 
idea of a big society. The government under Cameron would scale back its spending but would help 
entrepreneurs and small business to strengthen and increase profits.  
 
The coalition programme was the philosophical basis on which the coalition would be led. 
However, it is important to examine one area that had undermined previous leaders of the 
Conservative Party and that was the issue of Europe. The document states that the British government 
would ensure that the country was ‘a positive participant in the EU’131 but argued that there would be 
no further transfer of power between Westminster and Brussels. It can be inferred that this topic 
brought about tension between the two parties, the Liberal Democrats were pro-Europe, and the 
Conservatives were divided on the issues. The chapter on Europe only has nine key points, which is 
lower than many other chapters that saw major ideological differences between the parties. Cameron 
would not have wanted to alienate members of his party that were Eurosceptic because it would 
become difficult for him to pass meaningful legislation during his time in office. Cameron wanted to 
control the tone of the debate on Europe by trying to strike a balance that would see Britain remain an 
active member of the EU, especially when it came to issues such as crime and terrorism, but drew a 
red line on the issue of sovereignty. This poses the question of did Cameron truly deal with the issue 
of Europe? The answer is a categorical no. Cameron showed that the issue of Europe could still 
undermine or even overthrow a leader of the Conservative Party. This is evident in 2013 when forced 
by the rise of UKIP and some discontent amongst his own ranks, Cameron promised a referendum on 
the issue of the UK’s membership of the European Union and was the catalyst to his downfall.  
 
This leads to the theory that Cameron wanted to achieve modernisation but the complexity and 
responsibility of government forced Cameron to adopt more traditional stances to issues. This would 
provide an early test to the new coalition government and that was university tuition fees.  The 
coalition programme did not make any reference to a raise in academic fees stating that it was 
awaiting the publication of Lord Browne’s report on higher education funding but stated that the 
government’s main aim would be to ensure that universities remain essential for building a strong 
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society as well as being a cornerstone to the economic recovery. Upon assuming power, the coalition 
government continued to mention a black hole in the public finances meant that they would have to 
undertake tough decisions to lower the deficit. The government planned to raise the fees students paid 
from £3000 to £9000. Such an increase led to protests and the opposition arguing that such a policy 
would lead to a lack of social mobility. Cameron argued that his new system ‘would widen access to 
university’132 and statistics that focused on the entirety of the coalition government showed that ‘the 
number of home applicants to UK universities fell after the increase in fees, but broadly the 
application rate of 18-year-olds has continued to increase.’133 One possibility for this being the case is 
the economic recession, students were more likely to stay in full time education if there was little 
possibility of going into a full-time job. Statistics published by the Department for Business stated 
that ‘The provisional HEIPR estimate for the 2011/12 academic year was 49%, up by three percentage 
points compared with the estimate for 2010/11 of 46’134the conclusion that the report reached was that 
students were choosing not to defer their studies and this resulted in a 3 point increase in attendance 
over the course of one academic year.0 
 
The policy gained much criticism with the institute of fiscal studies stating that ‘43p in every £1 
of loans would not be repaid’135 the plan set out by the Chancellor and the Education secretary was 
see a decrease in public spending on higher education, the most common way of analysing the effect 
the policy on tuition fees has had on public spending is to examine the amount the government 
borrowed to pay for all the student loans. The Treasury predicts that the cost could range as high as 
2.2 percent above inflation, this estimate is to brace the economic markets if the government made 
substantial losses from this policy. Cameron in this respect did not modernise his party’s policy in 
education he wholeheartedly accepted the notion of competition that was at the heart of Margaret 
Thatcher’s 1988 education act. The government would actively support students who wanted the 
opportunity to go to universities but they wanted to reap a long-term benefit from doing so. There are 
scholars such as R. Dearing who argue that this was a purpose of the 1988 education act to create a 
system that benefited economic markets. Thus, Cameron was merely applying this mantra to 
universities. Was this policy successful? It is hard to state whether this policy was a success because 
there are arguments for both sides. The policy did see the government make savings in public 
spending, which was important for the government to do as the deficit was out of control. Secondly, 
the policy aimed to restructure the way students paid off their debts. From a political perspective, the 
policy on tuition fees undermined the coalition. Many Liberal Democrats and some Conservatives’ 
broke ranks and voted against the motion. It undermined the electability of the Liberal Democrats 
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who had campaigned on the pledge that there would be no increase on university fees and if it were 
proposed, they would actively oppose it. Cameron at this point began to experience an erosion of 
support from his own party that would trigger the long path to his downfall. The main reason for this 
conclusion is because Cameron had spent five years as leader presenting a softer brand of 
Conservatism, based on traditional principles but for modern day society. The moment he became 
Prime Minister he reverted to the public's stereotype of the Conservative Party.  A party that was 
merely focused on the economy and disregarding the public services, mainly teachers, benefits, and 
notoriously the National Health Service. Cameron had promised to ring fence spending on the NHS 
but throughout his premiership it became a weapon that his political opponents used to undermine his 
push for internal reform. Cameron continued to drill home that the government had invested heavily 
and that there were 12,000 new nurses under his government. However, the UK Statistics Authority, 
‘concluded that spending on the NHS is actually lower in real terms now than it was in 2010’.136 This 
is where it is evident that the political rhetoric did not match the statistics. Cameron would have 
wanted to present to the public that the NHS could be trusted in the hands of the Conservatives. This 
is paralleled with Labour in 1997 who wanted to prove that they could be trusted with managing the 
economy as the Conservatives had spent decades highlighting the failure of the Labour governments 
in the 1970’s and the impact that the winter of discontent had on working class people. 
 
On the other hand, one area in which Cameron can still be considered a moderniser is 
devolution. The Conservative Party had opposed the devolution bill when it was proposed by Tony 
Blair but Martin Pugh argues that Cameron deserves some plaudits for what he has done regarding the 
devolved governments. Pugh states ‘Cameron surprised observers by adopting a conciliatory approach 
to Scottish nationalism’137 granting them extra powers that allowed the Scottish Parliament to change 
their rates of income tax. However, it is postulated by Pugh that this was done out of fear, Cameron 
did not want to be the Prime Minister that oversaw the breakup of the United Kingdom. He was to 
acknowledge that his party did not appeal to many devolved voters with only one Scottish MP on the 
government benches at Westminster. It would have come as a shock when in 2011 the SNP won an 
outright majority gaining 69 seats out of 129 in the Scottish Parliament. This presented a realistic 
opportunity for the SNP to push for independence. Alex Salmond understood that there was a growing 
dissent amongst English voters who supported the idea of Scotland leaving the UK. In this area 
Cameron chose not to modernise, he wanted to fight tooth and nail to ensure that the UK would not be 
separated. Yet the coalition government legislated the Edinburgh agreement, which gave Scotland the 
opportunity to hold an independence referendum by the end of 2014. The agreement was a chance to 
‘deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland and a result that 
                                                          
136 Department for Health. ͚StatistiĐs oŶ NHS Hospital AĐtiǀitǇ͛ UK Statistics Authority. 2012. 
137 Pugh, Martin. ͚State and Society Fourth Edition: A Social and Political History of Britain Since 1870.͛ 
Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. 
51 
 
everyone will respect.’138 Cameron during his years as opposition leader had not faced major crisis in 
his leadership but in his first two years as Prime Minister he had seen protests to his policies, like 
those that plagued the Thatcher administrations. Riots across the country that highlighted that the cuts 
he had implemented were so severe that police lost control of some areas of the capital and there was 
talk of using rubber bullets and the army. Most importantly was the prospect of being the Prime 
Minster who would have to end over 300 years of union. This leads to Snowden and Bale stating that 
he was an essay crisis Prime Minister because he went from crisis to crisis and believed that he was 
always in a position of power. Cameron appeared as ‘a leader who has seemed dominant one moment, 
impotent the next, and then dominant again’139 This would be seen in the referendum itself with 
Cameron believing that there would be overwhelming support for a no vote. As polling day 
approached and pollsters suggested that there was a chance of a yes victory Cameron and his 
leadership team sprang into action throwing everything they had into the campaign.  
 
Throughout his time as leader of the party, Cameron had pursued modernisation internally. 
During his first two years in power, Cameron paved the way for constitutional changes to 
government. The first was the plan to introduce the fixed term parliament's bill. The bill aimed to ‘to 
make provision for the dissolution of Parliament and the determination of polling day’140 the major 
benefits for enacting such legislation is it provided stability as political parties and the electorate knew 
when the next election was due to take place. It also enabled the government to prioritise their 
legislative programme because ‘the time available for the passage of the bills is more predictable.’141 
The road safety bill that the government introduced in November 2004 is a prime example of how 
effective the fixed term parliament act could be. The road safety bill went to the House of Lords in 
March 2005 but due to the dissolution of parliament and election in June 2005, it meant that the bill 
was lost in its entirety and had to be reintroduced by Tony Blair after his election victory. If the fixed 
term act had been in place during this period, it is apparent that the bill would have become ‘law first 
time around.’142 On the other hand, Cameron faced scrutiny from the House of Commons political and 
constitutional reform committee, the committee believed that Cameron had rushed proposals in order 
to gain a political advantage over his opponents arguing that ‘we regret the way that the unnecessarily 
rushed way in which the bill is being proceeded with.’143 It is evident that the committee agreed that 
the principle behind the introduction of the bill was justified as it prevented the Prime Minister calling 
a snap election in order to gain a larger majority in parliament. Yet the main concern for the 
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committee was the impact that the bill would have on parliament. It would oversee the abolishment of 
an executive power, the dissolution of parliament, but still allow the Prime Minister in extraordinary 
circumstances to still hold an early election. Bale supports the theory that Cameron merely used his 
position as leader of the Conservatives and later Prime Minister was to cement his hold on power. He 
states that upon forming the coalition Cameron's conservatives lack the ‘wealth of experience’144 in 
the House of Commons, coupled with the lack of support within the House of Lords which previous 
Conservative governments could rely on to pass their legislative agenda. The impact of the fixed 
parliament act is yet to be decided, the philosophy shows that Cameron was for modernising every 
aspect of society, even constitutional and political reform that would benefit all parties rather than just 
the government of the day. 
 
The second way the coalition government attempted to modernise the political system in the 
UK was the promise to hold a referendum on the voting system. The Conservative party wanted the 
public to side against the alternative voting system, because it would result in the Conservative party 
having less chance of securing a majority in future elections and break up the two-party system. It can 
be argued as a pursuit of modernisation because it highlights the ability of the leadership to govern in 
coalition and to concede political ground to their coalition partners. The UK uses the first past the post 
system, which means the candidate with the most number of votes wins the seat, however the major 
flaw, with the first past the post system is that the party with the most amount votes does not 
necessarily win most of the seats in the House of Commons. This system has been criticised and not 
representing the views of the UK with the Conservatives receiving 36 per cent of the vote and 
receiving 306 seats in the commons. The Liberal Democrats had campaigned on changing the voting 
system to the alternate voting system believing that this would represent the views of the electorate, as 
seats in the commons would have been distributed based on a party's percentage of the vote. ‘AV is a 
simple change that will make a big difference.’145 This was an important factor to the coalition 
agreement and Cameron promised to campaign to keep the status quo. Cameron would not want to 
risk the chance to gain a majority in future elections and so this was one are of political reform that 
Cameron and the Conservatives did not want to support.  
 
The agreement, which was forged between the two parties, was to ‘bring forward a Referendum 
Bill on electoral reform, which includes provision for the introduction of the Alternative Vote in the 
event of a positive result in the referendum, as well as for the creation of fewer and more equal sized 
constituencies.’146 This provides an insight into the political philosophy of Cameron. Cameron spent 
the early years of his leadership pushing through modern policies focusing on the NHS, social policy 
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and the environment. Instead of focusing on traditional issues such as defence, the economy and law 
and order. The coalition provided Cameron with the opportunity to actively pursue social change, 
claiming that it would be important if the coalition was going to see out its five-year term.  This is a 
different approach that had been taken by his predecessors and one that makes Cameron appear as a 
leader that managed to change the course of the Conservative party. Margaret Thatcher had always 
stood by her convictions and that ultimately led to her downfall. Cameron on the other hand wanted to 
ensure that the Conservatives were not portrayed, as out of touch and to achieve this Cameron had to 
concede political ground to the Liberal Democrats. The referendum on the voting system allowed 
open discussion on how members of Parliament are elected; the vote overwhelmingly supported the 
Conservatives with over 60 percent voting against the motion. Research carried out following the 
election by Parliament found that ‘The No vote was in the majority in every region of the UK.’147 
 
As previously stated, Cameron began to abandon his pursuit of modernisation in 2008, yet it is 
the decision to pass the gay marriage act that shows that this was not solely for his own political 
ambitions. Cameron's leadership of the party can be analysed as full of ambition for both the country 
and the party. It can be seen as a motive behind leading the Conservatives into coalition when many 
of his Member of Parliament wanted to form a minority government and activists who believed that 
the two political parties shared common ground. The successes of the coalition were brought about by 
Cameron surrounding himself with like-minded individuals, this had been part of the coalition 
agreement that members of the Liberal Democrats leadership would be given high ranking roles 
within government such as the deputy Prime Minster and Chief of the treasury. This would become 
known as the Quod and it comprised of George Osborne, Nick Clegg and Danny Alexander who all 
wanted to see through the coalition programme. It is important to note that David Laws was a key 
figure in bringing about the coalition agreement but failed to play a bigger role due to a controversy. It 
is apparent that Cameron did not have much choice in this as Clegg would have wanted to put people 
who supported the idea of a coalition government. 
 
There was agreement between Cameron and Clegg that it was only a matter of time before the 
government introduced gay marriage but it was important to ensure that it happened under his 
leadership. |The coalition programme for government stated ‘We will use  our relationships with other 
countries to push for unequivocal support for gay rights and for UK civil partnerships to be 
recognised internationally.148The aim of the law was to make sure marriage between a couple of the 
same sex was ‘lawful.’149 However, Cameron faced a fierce battle to ensure that the bill would be 
passed through the commons. The party leadership expected at least half of the sitting MP is to revolt 
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against the proposal with Sir Roger Gale stating that the change was ‘Orwellian’150and that it was not 
for the government to introduce policy that redefines hundreds of years of history. It is apparent that 
Cameron was behind this policy and stated that ‘I do not support gay marriage despite being a 
conservative. I support gay marriage because I am a conservative’151 he had moved the party away 
from policies such as section 28 that meant it was illegal to promote homosexual material.  Cameron 
apologised for supporting such a policy but it showed that under his leadership Cameron wanted to 
address issues that effected many sections of society. Cameron understood the consequences of 
producing such a policy with critics from his own party, the church and from many who supported the 
idea that marriage was solely the union of a man and a woman. With the support of the Liberal 
Democrats, Cameron believed he would be able to push the gay marriage act through parliament. It is 
important to note that Cameron pushed through the gay marriage act before other western countries 
such as the United States who struggled to push through a gay marriage law until the Supreme Court 
acted, ‘ The decision, which was the culmination of decades of litigation and activism, set off 
jubilation and tearful embraces across the country, the first same-sex marriages in several states, and 
resistance — or at least stalling — in others.’152 The reason why this is considered important was 
because the Conservative party traditionally supported the notion that marriage was between a man 
and a woman but Cameron was determined to push for equality even if it resulted in a back bench 
rebellion and the alienation of the grass root base.  
 
Seldon and Snowden share the conclusion that Cameron firmly believed in gay marriage. 
Highlighting the significance of the bill if it passed through the commons, ‘it will send out a message 
if we do this; and it will send out a message if we don’t.’153 Cameron understood the risks of 
abandoning a policy that would have a significant effect on society. A few weeks’ prior his 
government had been heavily criticised for producing an ‘omnishambles budget.’154 The budget 
appeared to reinforce Labour’s rhetoric that the coalition was incapable of governing for the working 
class as the budget saw taxes being introduced on food and other necessities. The media presented this 
as a battle within the coalition with prominent donors such as Lord Ashcroft stating that ‘the main 
problem is not so much that people think the Conservative Party is heading in the wrong direction, it 
is that they are not sure where it is heading.’155 This pursuit of fiscal responsibility by Osborne again 
presented the party as out of touch and this is evident in the budget itself. The first chapter focus on 
how the government planned to lower the deficit and how it planned to restore investors’ confidence 
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in the market stating ‘monetary activism supporting the recovery, focused on meeting the inflation 
target, increasing the availability of credit to businesses and encouraging private sector investment;’156 
It was at this point that the leadership understood there had to be a change in strategy, the coalition 
was struggling to prevent rebellions from their coalition partners and this created the image that the 
coalition government was weak. The Conservatives polled strongly on the issue of the economy but 
struggled to convince people that they were capable of investing in public services. This highlights 
that throughout the period the Conservatives had not been committed to modernisation, they had 
attempted to rebrand the party and ultimately failed. Cameron needed to shift his focus to the 
forthcoming election and the decision he would make would bring an end to the pursuit for 
modernisation. 
 
 Thus, the government shifted its commitment to ensuring that the bill passed successfully 
through the chamber. The implications of abandoning a social policy that extended benefits to a group 
in society would undermine the Prime Minister’s’ authority to govern. Cameron was aware of the 
splits that were forming within his party with opposition to the bill intensifying as the vote 
approached. International observers and media such as the New York Times noted, ‘Few Prime 
Ministers have faced such an extensive rebellion in their own ranks.’157 The rebellion over gay 
marriage put a strain on Cameron’s relationship with the backbenchers with the 1922 committee 
arguing that the coalition did not have a mandate to legislate on the issue of gay marriage because it 
did not appear in the manifesto. It appeared to his critics that Cameron constructed the policy to 
attract voters and present a friendlier image of the Conservative Party. This policy would be defining 
moment of the coalition government; Cameron highlighted the significance of ‘leaders from across 
the political spectrum’158 putting aside their ideological differences for equality.  
 
Gay marriage had been a success for Cameron, yet the pursuit for modernisation within the 
Conservative Party effectively stopped when the party hired Lynton Crosby to be their chief strategist. 
Crosby constructed the ‘dog-whistle’159 approach to election campaigning. Crosby’s strategy focused 
the campaigns on particular group of voters by appealing directly to them. This is apparent in the 
federal election in Australia in 2005, ‘It is not racist to impose limits on immigration’160 by making 
the politicians address key issues and making it a recurring theme of the campaign, Crosby believed 
that such emphasis would result in a shifting of opinion polls. The 2005 federal election was a success 
for the Liberal Party in Austrailia, partly because Crosby focused the campaign message on five core 
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issues and forced the leadership to stick to these issues. However, Crosby understood the importance 
of playing on the electorate’s fears. A current administration can reflect and present evidence of it 
successes of a course of a parliament, whereas the opposition has to present policies which shows that 
they are a government in waiting. Crosby forced the narrative of the campaign to be about the 
negative consequences of voting for the Labour party and this is the same approach that Crosby would 
take when he hired by the Conservative Party in the UK.  
 
Crosby’s influence on the Conservative Party began in 2013 when there was a shift between 
Cameron’s pursuit for modernisation and adhering to a strict campaign message on the economy. 
Journalists point out that a key factor to the strategy would be to portray the Conservative Party as the 
‘most trustworthy on managing the economy.’161 To achieve this Crosby pursued a campaign of 
negativity. Cameron’s speeches on the economy shared a similar theme of criticism of Labour 
economic theory during their time in government. ‘We saw the broken model of growth that was 
propelling our economy into an increasingly unsustainable position’162 It is evident that early on the 
Conservative strategy leading up to the general election in 2015 was to present the Conservatives as 
working in the national interest. That Cameron and Osborne pursued an austerity programme due to 
the supposedly reckless management of the economy by the previous Labour government, and that the 
actions that had been taken by the coalition was needed if the country was to begin an economic 
recovery. The shift to traditional Conservative campaigning with emphasis on the core issues such as 
the economy and immigration provides insight into the thoughts of Crosby. He noted that Cameron 
had been ‘fucking off the party big time’163 on issues such as gay marriage and that if Cameron was to 
be successful in 2015 he would have to rely on his core voters for much of his support. Crosby wanted 
the party to understand the electorate’s fears and concerns rather than ‘plying them with positive ideas 
and optimistic visions.’164 
 
Snowden and Seldon reinforces the idea that Crosby understood the failings of Cameron’s 
leadership stating, ‘Everything is too fragmented’165 the sharp criticism shaped Cameron’s final two 
years in the coalition government. Crosby presented a bleak picture to Cameron and his leadership 
team that outlined areas for Cameron to focus on. The first was the party’s lack of appeal to ethnic 
voters. As previously stated, the Conservative Party polled 16 percent of the ethnic vote in 2010, 
coupled with the declining support of older voters. The Conservatives would need to win the 2015 
election by seven-percentage point in order to gain a small majority in the commons. Polls suggested 
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that Labour had a comfortable lead over the Conservatives and this had an impact on the Party’s 
morale. Cameron needed to recapture the personality of Thatcher during the early 1980’s if he was to 
be successful in winning a majority in 2015; Crosby intended to create the perception that Cameron 
and Osborne saved the economy from Labour as Thatcher had done in 1979. An example of this 
would be the Coalition’s’ attempt to introduce plain packaging for cigarettes. Crosby felt that this 
policy distracted the Conservative Party from its core message and pushed for the policy to be 
removed. Crosby received fierce criticism for he had ‘extensive tobacco industry connections.’166 
Therefore, when the government abandoned it plans to introduce plain packaging it appeared as if he 
had lobbied the Prime Minister on their behalf. The government’s official explanation was that it 
wanted to measure the ‘emerging impact of the decision in Australia’167 The significance of the UK 
adopting such a policy would have impacted the revenue made by the tobacco industry, for other 
countries would have followed the UK’s lead. 
 
Crosby also highlighted the difference between the Conservative Party in the cities and out in 
rural areas. Modernisation appeared ‘socially liberal’168 and it would be hard to unite voters who lived 
in rural areas to the campaigns message if it focused on a modernisation agenda. Crosby pushed for 
the focus of the campaign in government to be on issues that matter to much of people tax, 
immigration and Europe, which had been gaining momentum with the rise of UKIP in British politics. 
Nevertheless, the area on which Crosby made a lasting impact was the language and tone of 
Cameron’s speeches. It was important to manipulate the language of the speeches to become 
‘personally relevant to voters’169 and focus on issues that unite the party rather than divide it. It was 
important for Cameron to prioritise issues that the voters wanted him to focus on, rather than pursue 
policy that interested him such as modern slavery. It was ‘scraping the barnacles of the boat’170 and 
ensuring that Cameron and Osborne adhered to his strict plan. Crosby understood that time was 
against the Conservatives and if they had any chance of success they needed to have a sole leader of 
the campaign as this was a major downfall that prevented the Conservatives gaining an outright 
majority.  
 
However, one criticism of Crosby’s approach is that it heavily relied on the core vote. Previous 
leaders such as Hague and Howard abandoned their pursuit for modernisation and retreated to their 
base as the election drew closer. The dog whistle tactic that was constructed by Crosby was designed 
to bring ‘focus’171 to the campaign but it contradicted the hard work Cameron had put into 
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modernising the party. As leader, he had successfully introduced internal reforms, such as the 
restructuring of the party. In government, he had introduced constitutional reform and social reform, 
Crosby expected Cameron and his leadership team to abandon their pursuit for further reform and 
focus on winning the next election. For Cameron, this would have been a difficult choice to make 
because he had achieved more as leader than his predecessors between 1997-2005. Furthermore, to 
avoid his government becoming fixated on the issue of Britain leaving the European Union in 2016, 
Cameron resigned because it was an issue that he felt so strongly about, but also because he had 
planned to implement more reforms over the course of his term. 
 
The two speeches made by Cameron at the Conservative party conferences of 2012 and 2014 
show the impact Crosby had on the political language of Conservative policies and the influence he 
had in shaping events leading up to the 2015 election campaign. The two openings of the speeches 
show the influence of Crosby on the Conservative Party. In 2012 Cameron presented himself as a 
politician who was out of touch arguing that he needed ‘To mend a broken society’172 when compared 
to 2014 we see a more emotional, conviction led approach to Cameron like that of Thatcher. ‘Duck 
the fight and our union could have been taken apart bit by bit. Take it on and we had the chance to 
settle the question.’173 in this respect Lynton Crosby forced Cameron to acknowledge the ideological 
differences between the coalition partners. In his 2012 speech Cameron focused on international 
events such as the Queens Diamond Jubilee and the 2012 Olympics rather than the stresses of 
government. ‘My best moment was putting the gold medal around the neck of Ellie Simmonds’174 it 
was important for Cameron to acknowledge the successes of the early years in coalition, the Olympics 
and Paralympics provided an opportunity for Cameron to challenge stereotypes and stigmas that had 
attached themselves to society, most notably the disabled. Reflecting upon his own personal tragedy, 
Cameron demonstrated the principles behind the big society. For he had witnessed the suffering and 
torment of his own son and believed that society saw the wheelchair and not the person, but the 
Paralympics opened society’s eyes and Cameron firmly believed that as a result of Britain successes, 
more people would ‘see the boy and not the wheelchair.’175 Crosby ushered Cameron back to 
traditional Conservative values, ‘families come first. They are the way you make a nation strong from 
the inside out.’176 Prior to Crosby the Conservative party and its leadership was disjointed it lacked a 
credible plan to ensure that it would win a majority at the next election. Cameron and Osborne had 
preferred to produce policy that they felt would move Britain into the twenty-first century, even if this 
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meant alienating some members of his own parliamentary party, and members of the local 
associations. It was important to move away from this style of governing, and Crosby showed in the 
2014 leader’s speech to the conference what the Conservative party strategy would be. The first 
would be to distance Cameron from the perception that he was open to the idea of another coalition 
government. Instead Cameron would forcefully state that he wanted ‘to be back here in October 2015, 
delivering Conservative policies based on conservative values and leading a Conservative majority 
government.’177 The second, Crosby needed to create the perception that the only way to ensure that 
the economy would continue to grow, unemployment would go down and Britain was safer was with 
a Conservative government. Labour have lost its economic credibility following the crash of 2008 and 
that they were willing to govern with the support of parties who had attempted to undermine and 
destroy the United Kingdom. By playing at people’s fear, and presenting Cameron as the only leader 
fit to govern, Crosby reassured many core voters who had become disillusioned at Cameron’s 
leadership. 
 
From a political perspective, Crosby ensured that Cameron would not be undermined by 
members of his own party as previous leaders had been. Between 1997 to 2013 all leaders of the 
Conservative party had attempted to re-define the meaning of conservatism. Major had attempted to 
distance himself from his predecessor by returning ‘to core values’178 however the power vacuum that 
had been created following the downfall of Margaret Thatcher in 1990 meant major could not fulfil 
his ambitions. Subsequent leaders up until Cameron had also failed in their attempt to redefine the 
party’s philosophy. It is evident that the reason why so many leaders failed to introduce reform and 
modernisation was due to the lack of support amongst local activists. They had become disillusioned 
and angered by the party leadership, firstly because the leadership had abandoned its neoliberal beliefs 
and secondly due to the push for a more centralised head office. The Conservative party had been the 
most successful political party in Britain during the twentieth century, it had always led Britain 
through times of great difficulty. The Conservative party that emerged after the landslide victory of 
Tony Blair in 1997 was a shadow of the party’s former glory. Crosby pulled Cameron and the 
Conservative party away from the possibility of losing the 2015 general election and steered the party 
away from modernisation. Leading up to the general election, there were few references by Cameron 
to policies he had pursued in the early years of his leadership. 
 
This hard-line approach that Cameron adopted, partially stemmed from the rise of the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) between 2010-2015. The party had been founded to fight 
against Britain’s membership of the European Union, and in 1997 UKIP argued that the ‘majority of 
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the people of this country boycott its elections’179 that the European Union ruled its member states by 
degree and was filled with corruption. The Conservative Party and its leaders had been torn over the 
issue of Europe, however Cameron’s tough stance on Europe began when the Lisbon treaty was 
ratified by all twenty-seven member states. Cameron argued that ‘Never again should it be possible 
for a British government to transfer power to the EU without the say of the British people.’180 The 
Lisbon treaty181 oversaw the creation of a European president and foreign minister and for many 
Conservatives this undermined the sovereignty of Parliament as Britain now answered to an unelected 
official in Brussels. Therefore, it was important for Cameron to show that under his leadership and if 
he were to lead the conservative party to victory he would ensure that there would be no more 
transfers of power between London and Brussels. On the other hand, Nigel Farage leader of UKIP 
highlighted the weaknesses of the Conservative Party stating that Cameron did not want to focus on 
the issue of Europe because ‘it is a debate Cameron does not want because of the huge divisions 
within his own party on the issue due to the horror of the clear majority of Conservative party 
members who think about country before party’182 this issue shows the complexity of the British 
political system. The Conservative Party and Labour had to present themselves as the party best fit to 
form the next government, parties such as UKIP did not have the same restraint. Thus, it meant they 
could focus on issues such as Europe and argue the benefits of the UK leaving the EU.   
 
The first test UKIP presented to Cameron was at the 2009 European elections. The election 
results across Europe showed a trend that voters were leaning towards right wing parties. In Britain 
UKIP managed to finish as the second largest party winning 13 seats. The Guardian argued that the 
successes were due to voter’s discontent at the ‘expenses scandal’183 and that people distrusted the 
main parties and that this success was because people were protesting the Westminster elite. 
However, Farage countered these arguments by stating that the party’s performance had been 
enhanced because people ‘agree with us that we should be friendly with Europe, trade with Europe, be 
good neighbours, but not have our laws made there.’184 For Cameron the European elections should 
have been a jubilant occasion as he had lead the party to 26 seats at the European parliament twice the 
size of both UKIP and Labour, however the elections posed questions to the Conservative leader as to 
why so many conservative voters had defected to UKIP.  
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The Conservative party had underestimated the power of UKIP in persuading voters to support 
their cause ‘many of the party's traditional supporters, who switched to UKIP in the European poll, 
will come back.’185 It is evident that Cameron and Osborne had focused their efforts in winning the 
local election as they provided a clearer indicator into the national mood than the European elections. 
However, the leadership’s failure to address voters’ discontent with the European Union with policies 
aimed to shore up the vote would strengthen Nigel Farage’s influence in British politics in the years to 
come. In some respects, the European elections shows Cameron’s arrogance as leader, as he is 
presented with an opportunity to address an issue that had torn his party apart since John Major and he 
believes that the voters protest was merely down to their lack of trust in the mainstream political 
parties, rather than a growing euro-scepticism towards the European Union. Therefore, Seldon and 
Snow argue that Cameron allowed situations to grow out of control before stepping in is correct as 
Cameron allowed voters discontent over Europe to grow until he was left with no choice but to call a 
referendum on the issue. ‘The history is a well-documented one of aloofness, vetoes and opt-outs, 
with a political and media debate that has been largely negative’186 the pragmatic relationship between 
Britain and the EU had become strained but Cameron would ultimately failed to connect the issue of 
Europe to a wider set of issues. There were a few reasons to call the referendum but it can be argued 
that it was an attempt to ease tensions that had grown between the coalition partners.  
 
Cameron also faced opposition internally on the issue of Europe. Boris Johnson who would 
later play a pivotal role in the European referendum in 2016 once stated that ‘the Tory party was a 
vast organism animated by a few vague principles’187 but when it came to the issue of Europe the 
party simply ‘never got over it’188 Cameron suffered from constant interference from previous 
government ministers who wanted to argue both sides of the argument over Europe. One of the most 
notable was former Chancellor Nigel Lawson who argued that as early as 1989 it was obvious that the 
European Union was a ‘political and not an economic project’189 which had been designed to create an 
integrated Europe. Former Conservative ministers, especially those who had served under Margaret 
Thatcher would have considerable influence over local activists and members it was important for 
Cameron to outline a clear Conservative policy over Europe and it is evident he failed. Cameron had 
spent his opposition opposing the Lisbon treaty and proposing a referendum for the future transfer of 
powers to Brussels but he believed in the economic benefits that being a member of the EU brought. 
Yet he understood that it would be a matter of time before he was forced to address the issue head on. 
                                                          
185 Pierce, AŶdreǁ. ͚EuropeaŶ eleĐtioŶs ϮϬϬϵ: Daǀid CaŵeƌoŶ's ǀiĐtoƌǇ teŵpeƌed ďǇ Ukip suƌge͛ Telegraph. 
2009. 
186 Oliǀer, Tiŵ. ͚To ďe oƌ Ŷot to ďe iŶ Euƌope: is that the ƋuestioŶ? BƌitaiŶ͛s EuƌopeaŶ ƋuestioŶ aŶd aŶ iŶ/out 
referendum͛ IŶterŶatioŶal affairs. ϮϬϭϱ. 
187 JohŶsoŶ, Boris. ͚The Essential: Lend Me Your Ears͛. LoŶdoŶ. ϮϬϬϯ 
188 Ibid p.181 
189 Lawson, Nigel. ͚Memoirs of a Tory Radical.͛ LoŶdoŶ. 2010. P.267 
62 
 
During the coalition years it would have been unthinkable for Cameron to announce any policy that 
appeared to be euro-sceptic, considering his coalition partners the Liberal Democrats were a pro-
European party. Early on in the coalition discussions it is evident that it was an issue that neither party 
was willing to give ground. William Hague described his coalition partners as willing to ‘sign up for 
anything that has ever been on offer or proposed from the European Union’190 for the Liberal 
Democrats understood that the European Union had made pointless decisions such as the definition of 
chocolate but pointed out the cooperation that had been made on the financial sector, terrorism and 
crime as initiatives that kept Britain safer.  
 
However, for Cameron and the Conservative party there were to major factions during his 
leadership. The first were members who wanted the EU to reform and secondly those who wanted to 
leave the EU. Scholars such as Simon Hix argue that the EU had ‘pretended that there is no politics in 
Brussels’191 that the organisation worked through politically neutral institutions who wanted to ensure 
that all member states cooperated with one another. Yet Hix continues to argue that this was a charade 
as behind the photos of the head of states at the quarterly meeting of the European leaders, there was a 
ferocious political battle over how quickly the European Union should integrate. This is evident in the 
Conservative party firmly opposing Britain joining the euro when William Hague was leader stating 
that the ‘Labour government is taking us down the road to a European super state.’192 So it can be 
argued that Cameron enabled UKIP to take arguments the Conservatives had been making for years. 
It had been assumed that when the Conservative came to power, although shared with the Liberal 
Democrats, the new government would take a harder line on immigration. ‘The pledge had been 
widely criticised as impossible to guarantee because of free movement rights within the EU’193 and 
during the coalition immigration rose. Originally under the coalition agreement there was no cap on 
immigration, but the government did introduce a cap on non-EU migrants entering the country and 
ensuring that illegal immigrants were being stopped through tougher checks. 
 
UKIP under Nigel Farage, had progressed from a fringe euro-sceptic party to a party who rode 
on the current of voters’ ‘distaste for the political establishment. Arguing that the only way Britain 
could reclaim control of its national borders was by leaving the EU.’194 This messaged resonated with 
some members of the Conservative Party with two members of Parliament defecting to UKIP. 
Douglas Carswell attacked Cameron by arguing that the Prime Minister was not ‘serious about the 
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change we need in Europe.’195 Carswell reinforced the idea that under Cameron’s leadership there had 
been a schism between the leadership and the local associations. Carswell believed that the leadership 
were not on the side of its members and that the only way he could bring about attention was to leave. 
This provided a political headache for Cameron because defeat at the by-election was real. Cameron 
could not allow the euro-sceptics in his party and in the Commons, harden their rhetoric and calls for 
a referendum and renegotiation on Britain’s membership. He had just fought a bitter campaign to keep 
the Union together and now he was faced with a bye-election which would focus on the issue of 
Europe.  
 
Under his leadership, Cameron had allowed the right-wing to grown and fixate the public on 
the notion that the European Union had failed in its attempt to bring about what they called a 
European ‘super state’ an economic and political Union. This rise in populist politics and the 
successes UKIP had made between 2009-2014 forced Cameron to address the issue head on. In 
January 2013 Cameron outlined his plan to hold a referendum on the status of Britain’s membership 
of the EU. It was time in Cameron’s opinion for the ‘British people to have their say’196 Critics 
attacked the Prime Minister for giving in to UKIP, who had seen their momentum in the polls 
continue and Cameron could not rely on traditional Conservative voters returning to party at the 
general elections. It is at this point that Cameron’s conservative party became consumed once again 
over the issue of Europe and it would be unlikely that he would be able to continue his pursuit to 
modernisation without the support of a united party behind him. The government published the 
European Union referendum bill and it labelled out the timetable that the government would stick to if 
the Conservatives won an outright majority at the next election. ‘The Secretary of State shall by order, 
and before 31 December 2016, appoint the day on which the referendum is to be held.’197 
 
One success of calling a referendum was that it gave the people the chance to voice their 
opinions on Britain’s membership of the European Union. However, some of the Westminster parties 
such as Labour and the Liberal Democrats refused to hold a referendum if they were to form the next 
government in 2015. This gave Cameron the opportunity to present himself and the party as the only 
option to guarantee the chance to vote on Europe. ‘Ed Miliband effectively ruled out a referendum on 
Britain's membership of the EU today, pledging that he would only hold one in the “unlikely” event 
that Westminster had to transfer more powers to Brussels.’198 This opened the divide amongst the 
political parties, Labour and the Liberal Democrats were pro-European parties and UKIP were the 
only united party who were strongly opposed to the EU. The Conservatives who had given a cast iron 
                                                          
195 Watson, IaŶ. ͚Tory MP Douglas Carswell defects to UKIP and forces by-election͛ BBC. ϮϬϭϰ. 
196 Watson, IaŶ. ͚David Cameron promises in/out referendum on EU͛ BBC. ϮϬϭϯ 
197 House of CoŵŵoŶs. ͚European Union (Referendum) Bill͛ LoŶdoŶ. ϮϬϭϯ. 
198 Miliband, Edǁard. ͚EU referendum is 'unlikely' under Labour͛ ITV. ϮϬϭϰ. 
64 
 
guarantee on the referendum who were split over the issue. Cameron had willingly given his party the 
chance to addr0ess the issue of Europe he wanted the government’s position to be to negotiate 
reforms and then vote to stay in but gave backbenchers the opportunity to choose which side of the 
campaign they wanted to be on. Even William Hague who had been a euro-sceptic during his tenure 
as leader argued that the UK should remain a leading figure with the European Union and that the 
country should wait to see what concessions David Cameron could get from his European 
counterparts. 
 
During the course of the coalition Cameron had prioritised the coalition programme to bring 
about social change. This is evident in the final few months of the coalition, it had been heralded as ‘a 
brave new departure for British politics’199 although it had been the first coalition that had been 
formed with no party commanding the confidence of the House of Commons. Both Cameron and 
Clegg understood that they had placed their own reputations on the line to ensure that the coalition 
worked. There had been a number of successes such as the economy, same sex marriage and finally 
stability. Many had assumed that the coalition would not see its full tenure and that a two-party 
government was able to see its full term helped secure the economy.  
 
This led Cameron into the campaign of 2015. Crosby had ensured that the party would keep to 
two main messages, first was that Cameron took the bold step to enter a coalition and that under his 
and Osborne’s leadership the economy had turned around and if people did not credit the recovery to 
the government, then the electorate would not want to risk the recovery by casting a vote for Labour. 
Secondly that if there was no party managed to secure a majority the Scottish Nationalists would prop 
up a Labour government and hold it to ransom. The BBC labelled this as the ‘ransom argument’200 it 
used the rising English nationalism to undermine Labour’s argument that it would be an effective 
Government. The Manifesto published by the Conservatives argued that Britain had been on the brink 
with the outgoing Labour government stating that ‘there is no money.’201 Cameron argued that his 
economic plan reflected the values of the Conservative party, that a government should not be passing 
unaffordable levels of debt to the next generation. The first phase was to reduce government spending 
by ‘one percent each year in real terms’202 over the first two years of the next parliament. This 
approach was like that taken by the Thatcher government in 1979 when they took over following the 
winter of discontent. It was evident that by promoting fiscal responsibility they would be able to push 
the budget towards a surplus by 2018-2019. This was the second stage of the Conservative economic 
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plan as it meant they could pay down the debt, and reducing the repayments on the interest. This 
would protect the economy from future economic vulnerabilities.   
 
However, critics such as Nicola Sturgeon argued that the Conservatives had failed to bring 
about economic reform and built the economy on the foundations that had led to the economic crash. 
She attacked the ‘most iniquitious policy since Thatcher's poll tax' and describes the PM as 'arrogant'. 
203It was believed that for three decades the economy had become unbalanced with the majority of the 
nation’s wealth being made from the capital. ‘Today our economy is heavily reliant on just a few 
industries and a few regions’204 the UK had the highest economic imbalance amongst over European 
countries raising faster under the coalition government than it had under the Labour government. This 
economic failure reinforced the argument that the Conservative party only supported the wealthy and 
abandoned those in the remote regions of the country. This argument for economic efficiency focuses 
on the idea that economic national growth could be more sustainable if it benefited the whole country.  
 
Osborne created the policy of the northern powerhouse. Between 2014-2015 the north grew 
faster than the south, the plan was for the treasury to invest ‘£13 billion pounds in transport’205 for if 
the government could create a modern infrastructure they could increase the economic outputs of 
areas such as Newcastle and Manchester. The reason behind focusing on building a northern 
powerhouse was so the Conservatives could challenge Labour and potentially win enough swing seats 
to form a majority. Crosby ensured that Osborne reiterated that over the last year unemployment in 
the north had fell by 20 percent and that the government had done more than previous Labour 
governments in trying to secure the economic prosperity for the future. ‘last autumn, across the 
political divide, we reached an absolutely ground-breaking devolution agreement with the elected 
leaders of Greater Manchester.’206 By devolving powers and investing the Conservatives had hoped to 
see some gains politically. However, policies such as the northern powerhouse contradict Cameron’s 
approach to leading his party, under the course of his government he had overseen the creation of 
elected police commissioners, mayors and guaranteed the concession of powers from Westminster to 
the devolved assemblies. Yet he had pushed for a more centralised central office who controlled the 
messages and campaigns rather than the local associations. It is apparent that Cameron during his time 
as leader and Prime Minister had his own unique style of governance. He presided over cabinet 
meetings like chairman of the board, allowing the departments to run themselves and reporting to him 
when he requested it. This decision to allow the departments to organise and run themselves 
ultimately led to the assumption that Cameron failed to understand the problems facing the UK.  
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It reinforces the perception that Cameron trusted his cabinet to fulfil their duties as the majority 
of speeches about the northern powerhouse had been made by the Chancellor and if we look back at 
policies such as the reorganisation of the NHS and the rise of University fees we see the secretary of 
education and health being the members giving the speeches and addressing the house during debates. 
The language of the manifesto also reinforces the idea that Cameron had simplified his message the 
first few chapter focus on the notion that the Conservatives had formed a government in the national 
interest rather than trying to form a minority government and achieve no change as a result. The 
Manifesto also focuses all major social reform through an economic perspective and uses Crosby’s 
language as way to reinforce the core vote but convince undecided voters to support Cameron. For 
example, the manifesto pledges to ‘pass a new law so that nobody working 30 hours on the Minimum 
Wage pays Income Tax on what they earn’207 Crosby argued that by highlighting that under Labour 
people had seen their taxes go into a welfare system that made it plausible for people to choose 
benefit over work, they could convince voters that only the Conservative party were committed to 
welfare reform and that Labour would merely let the issue spiral out of control and not tackle benefit 
fraud.  
 
The 2015 election saw the return of statecraft, defined as the skill entailed in leading a country, 
mainly due to the influence of Crosby on Cameron and the party. For political historians, such as 
Seawright and Bale they argue that Cameron brought back the ‘appetite for power’208 within the party. 
For these historian’s statecraft is the methods on which the Conservatives seek to win back power. 
The coalition government showed that Cameron could govern the country competently and over saw a 
stable government that brought about a number of social and economic reforms. There was one issue 
that Cameron faced a lot of criticism over was immigration. Cameron had pledged that during the 
coalition that the government would ensure that ‘Net migration needs to come down radically from 
hundreds of thousands a year, to just tens of thousands.’209 This pledge undermined Cameron’s 
approach to modernisation because since 2007 Cameron had moved away from his reform agenda to 
rebalancing his political thought to traditional issues such as law and order, immigration and tax 
reform. As a result, Bale believed that this ‘undermined Cameron’s claims to have made a decisive 
shift’210 to the centre ground of British politics. In real terms immigration leading up to the end of 
2014 had risen up to ‘260,000 in the year ending June 2014, a statistically significant increase from 
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182,000 in the previous 12 months.’211 The topic of immigration became a fierce topic of debate 
leading into the election with Labour reiterating Cameron’s promise that if he failed to reduce net 
migration down to the tens of thousands the British public should ‘vote us out.’212 As a direct 
consequence of the fierce criticism from his political opponents and some aspects of the media such 
as the guardian, Cameron changed the language in the manifesto pledging that it was an ambition of 
the next Conservative government to ‘delivering annual net migration in the tens of thousands, not the 
hundreds of thousands.’213 They argued that they could achieve this by reforming welfare rules that 
affected controlled migration from the European Union and by clamping down on illegal immigration 
through a stronger border force. The Conservatives understood that if immigration is out of control it 
puts ‘pressure on schools, hospitals and transport.’214  
 
However, the public did not positively receive Cameron’s argument on immigration because 
UKIP and Nigel Farage argued that the establishment had continually promised to reduce migration 
but regardless of political allegiance neither party was truly committed to immigration reform. UKIP 
argued that Cameron’s promise had ‘never been a genuine pledge’215 because Britain’s membership of 
the EU meant that they could not effectively stop EU migrants entering the country because all 
member states had signed up to the freedom of movement. It was important for the Conservatives 
during the campaign to separate the issue of immigration and Europe because they could not afford to 
be dragged into a debate that solely focused on the issue of Europe. Furthermore, the Conservatives 
had acted in lowering non-EU migration, the policy was ‘designed to protect domestic workers from 
being undercut by foreign workers.’216 For statistics, such as those from the migration observatory 
show that during the coalition immigration became one of the key issues that voters were concerned 
about. ‘Majorities of respondents think that there are too many migrants, that fewer migrants should 
be let in to the country, and that legal restrictions on immigration should be tighter.’217 It was an issue 
that Cameron could not afford to be perceived as weak with the rise of UKIP and the growing calls for 
a quick referendum. 
 
Although Cameron had set in motion the referendum on Britain’s membership they could not 
deviate from the core message on the economy and the possibility of a Labour-SNP alliance 
demolishing all the successes the coalition had made. Snow and Seldon argued that the party could 
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not understand the reason why the polls had not supported the reports the leadership were getting 
from the ground. ‘We are getting such a good sense on the ground,’218 however pollsters suggested 
that Cameron had been failing to get his message across to the voters, through flat speeches and the 
failure to answer questions, this resulted in the perception that Cameron did not care for the average 
voter and did not fight for the causes that affected the clear majority of the electorate such as the 
NHS, benefits, social mobility, the minimum wage and other social issues.  
 
Vinen argues these failures from a philosophical standpoint, dating back to the governments of 
Thatcher stating that neo-liberalism was born out of a ‘relative decline rather than about the extent to 
which people enjoyed the fruits of prosperity.’219 Therefore Cameron would struggle to be perceived 
as sincere on these issues of social change because the Conservative economic policy was like the 
economic policies that had been undertaken by pervious Conservative governments. It as this point 
that Crosby changes the perception of the campaign, if the party could not convince the electorate that 
their policies would cement the economic recovery, the campaign shifted their attention to making the 
electorate see Cameron as the best choice for Prime Minister and comparing Cameron to Ed Miliband.  
Bale argues that Labour had an opportunity to win the 2015 election, the Conservative campaign had 
focused in reinforcing the idea that the economic crash in 2008 was Labour’s fault and that they had 
failed to move on from their failed economic policies. This is similar to what happened to the 
Conservatives after the election in 1997, because Labour argued that they destroyed the myth that the 
Conservatives had a golden economic legacy. Yet Bale states that Labour had a chance at electoral 
success due in part to the political beliefs of most British voters the ‘bulk of the electorate remains 
socially authoritarian and economically on the centre left.’220 
 
Another way in which Cameron could convince voters that the Conservative party would build 
on the successes of the coalition years was through televised debates. The televised debates had been 
a success during the 2010 election as it allowed the Liberal Democrats to stand against the two main 
parties of British politics and it can be inferred that the televised debates helped the Liberal 
Democrats gain national exposure even if Clegg’s performances had not translated into a gain in the 
number of seats in the House of Commons. The 2015 debates took a different structure to those that 
took place in 2010, there was a seven party debate between all the parties that held seats in the 
commons, Cameron against Miliband and finally a one to one interview with Jeremy Paxman. The 
Independent argued that Cameron had ‘stuck rigidly to the Conservative party election play book’221 
and that this was apparent in all three of Cameron’s televised appearances. Crosby and Tory 
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strategists would have been happy that Cameron had continued to highlight the dangers Labour posed 
to the economy and that the only way to ensure sustainable economic growth was to vote for the 
Conservative Party. However, claims that Cameron had looked disinterested and passive continued to 
undermine the campaign. In his interview with Paxman Cameron had been labelled as ‘running away 
from his record’ on food banks and zero hour contracts. Cameron had become entrenched in a 
negative campaign it appeared as if he could not outline his vision for Britain if it were to elect a 
Conservative government. One aspect he drew fierce criticism was his inability to specify where the 
£10 billion of cuts were going to take place.   
 
After weeks of campaigning and the possibility of a second hung parliament, the British voters 
went to the polls on 7th May 2015. Cameron had spent the whole campaign appealing to voters with a 
simple message that the only party fit to govern was the Conservative party and that Labour had 
abandoned its golden economic legacy and refused to accept responsibility for the crash of 2008. 
English nationalism also played a role in this election with the Conservatives playing on the fears that 
the SNP would prop up a Labour minority government in return for special privileges.  Conservative 
strategists had hope for a tally of around 290 seats and where amazed that the party managed to win 
an outright majority. It is important to note that this was largely due to the influence of Crosby who 
upon arrival in 2013, organised the party to adhere to a strict message that it would not deviate from. 
Secondly he ended the hopes of the Conservative Party modernising under David Cameron, he had 
witnessed the chaos that had ensured within the party whilst the gay marriage act was being pushed 
through parliament and even if he supported gay marriage he did not want to present the image that 
the party had remained fractured.  
 
Yet the Guardian said that the decision to run a negative campaign had a direct impact on the 
outcome stating that ‘the result was a vindication.’222 It is obvious that Cameron entered his second 
term with great enthusiasm and belief that the first Conservative majority government since Major 
could build on the successes that had been made during the coalition years. However, Cameron would 
not see out his second term as Prime Minister, a year after winning the election Cameron oversaw the 
biggest split within the Conservative Party since the split over protectionism in the early twentieth 
century. Once again the party had open debate over the issue of Europe which saw notable 
resignations from the Cabinet and the breakup of Cameron’s leadership team with Ian Duncan Smith, 
Boris Johnson and Michael Gove opposing the Prime Minister on the issue. Cameron had been 
criticised for running a negative campaign on Europe and this backfired when fifty-two percent of the 
electorate voted to leave the European Union. Commentators such as Jeremy Paxman criticise 
Cameron for allowing the referendum to take place because in his opinion Cameron had put party 
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over country stating ‘You look at the Brexit referendum - what Cameron did was to put the interests 
of his party above the interests of his country and that seems to me to be well-nigh unforgivable.’223 
Upon realising that he had lost in his bid to introduce meaningful reform to the EU, Cameron resigned 
as Prime Minister stating that ‘the British people made a different decision to take a different path. As 
such I think the country requires fresh leadership to take it in this direction,” Cameron said.’224 
 
Analysing Cameron’s eleven-year leadership it is apparent that he assumed the position 
believing that the party needed to modernise and reform if it was to win the election in 2010. 
Cameron’s years in opposition showed that this remained a key goal with reforms and policies that 
did not focus on traditional Conservative issues most notably social reform and the NHS. It is evident 
that after the economic crash Cameron moved away from modernisation and focused on securing the 
economic recovery and taking tough decisions knowing that there could be consequences, such as the 
rise in tuition fees to fill the black hole in the public finances, cutting the number of public service 
workers and cutting back government spending. However, the argument for modernisation within the 
Conservative party effectively ended when Cameron hired Lynton Crosby to run his campaign. 
Lynton understood the importance of convincing the core voters that the party understood their 
traditional values and ran campaign that effectively portrayed the opposition as weak and indecisive 
when it came to the big issues. Cameron achieved many successes as Prime Minister most notably the 
passing of the gay marriage act but it came at a price, by the end of his leadership it appeared that 
Cameron was facing open rebellions within his party over Europe and that he could no longer control 
all the factions within his party. His resignation can be seen as Cameron giving up after 11 years of 
hard work but it can be inferred and will be suggested that Cameron did want his premiership to be 
overwhelmed over the issue of Brexit, he had planned for further social reforms but felt that he could 
not get these laws through the House of Commons until the government evoked article 50. 
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Conclusion. 
The premature resignation, following the decision by the British public to leave the European 
Union brought an end to the Conservative Party’s pursuit for modernisation. His successor Theresa 
May has distanced herself from her predecessor’s legacy and has shifted focus towards the 
negotiations with the commission and bringing together the divided nation. The purpose of this 
dissertation was to examine the extent the Conservative Party had modernised, throughout the years in 
opposition, the coalition years and finally the surprise majority in 2015. It is evident that, during this 
period, the party was divided between neo-liberal Conservatives, who follow the ideology of Thatcher 
and those who align themselves with compassionate conservatism which developed at the end of the 
twentieth century in the USA and was taken up by leaders like Hague and Cameron. It demonstrated 
the balancing act a leader had to face in order to survive in the post, as they could no longer rely on 
the support of the Party’s grandees. By the mid 2000’s the Party’s head office distanced itself from 
the associations through centralised policies, that a leader had to rely on the power of language to 
enhance the chance of winning general elections. 
 
      It was the leadership of Hague that paved the way for the modernisation within the Conservative 
and it was his internal reforms help secure the leadership of future leaders such as Cameron. Hague 
understood that the party had become divided and that it had become complacent whilst in 
government, he began to pursue policies that appealed to outside the Conservative base but ultimately 
reverted to the base once it became apparent that he would not win the 2001 election. It can be argued 
that if Hague had followed Duncan Smith then perhaps the party would have done better in the 2005 
election. The changing role of the leader had developed whilst in opposition, previous leaders had 
always been prepared for their role in government but the message had become stale leading up to the 
1997 election. The leader needed to become a messenger for the party, between 1997-2005 it is 
apparent that the Party struggled to get its message across to the public. This was partly due to the 
effective governance of the country by New Labour. This was not the only factor, as Hague and Smith 
could not present the modernisation as nothing more than the party attempting to rebrand after having 
face the embarrassing defeat at the polls. 
 
Much of this dissertation focused on the leadership of Cameron, he would spend 10 years at the 
helm of the party and it is evident in his early years that he was committed to the goal of 
modernisation. While he was outspoken in his early years to campaigns such as the environment, 
Cameron would later be punished for pursuing modern policies. His pursuit for gay marriage created 
conflict within the Party and his unwillingness to engage with the local associations meant that 
Cameron had left himself politically isolated. It would only take one failure and in Cameron’s case the 
defeat in the referendum to ultimately erode the trust between the leader and the party. As mentioned, 
in the early years Cameron pushed his modern agenda, this is evident in policies such as the big 
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society and although this policy was not considered a success and Cameron would be ridiculed for the 
policy it shows that he wanted to be the man who led the Conservatives back into government. The 
opposition years did not offer much in policy because the successes of New Labour meant that the 
Conservative leadership was constantly changing their policy to present themselves as an alternative 
government. It is during the coalition years that policies reflect Cameron’s desire to modernise, the 
gay marriage act, the Scottish and European referendum showed that Cameron listened to the 
concerns of the public, although critics would argue that he was merely pursuing these policies to 
enhance his political capita and ensuring that the coalition would see out its full term. 
 
Yet the decision to hire Crosby spelt the end for the pursuit of modernisation. Crosby 
understood that if the Conservatives had a slim chance of securing a majority government in 2015 
they would have to focus the campaign on key messages. First was the issue of the economy, the 
Conservatives had lost the trust of the public following Black Wednesday. This coupled with New 
Labour’s effective management of the economy meant that the Conservatives had lost a key election 
issue to their opponents. Only when the economic crash of 2008 occurred were the Conservatives able 
to undermine the government and create the theory that it was Labour’s overspending that caused the 
recession. This would be crucial in Cameron being able to secure the largest percentage of the vote in 
2010, although it did not bring about a majority government it did allow the Conservatives to return 
into government as the largest partner of the coalition. The partnership Cameron had with the 
Chancellor George Osborne would be crucial in preventing New Labour from focusing on issues such 
as inequality and cuts to public services as the Conservatives message was that these were decisions 
that had to be made in light of the circumstances that they inherited a weak economy and tough 
decisions had to be made to see a return to economic growth.  
 
 Secondly the Conservatives constructed the narrative that Labour would form a coalition with 
the Scottish Nationalists. Crosby drilled into the leadership that this would undermine Cameron, 
especially after the hard-fought independence campaign as Labour would have to compromise in 
order to form a government and that the Conservatives and the public would not want to risk a second 
independence referendum. This was known as the ‘dog-whistle’ approach that Crosby had used to 
lethal effect in the Australian federal election in 2005, the language of the campaign needed to focus 
on the negatives of their opponents and in this case, it would be the prospect of a Labour-SNP 
coalition. This reinforced the dissertation’s theory that the messenger and the message were 
intertwined as Labour after Blair had lost its way, in a similar fashion the Conservatives had after the 
resignation of Margaret Thatcher in 1990. Over the course of his leadership Cameron had focused on 
his modernisation agenda, and Labour had become complacent in government, the weak opposition 
meant that Cameron would be able to bring about social reforms. Early into the coalition there had 
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been some social successes but Cameron was unable to present them in a positive fashion to the 
public.  
 
      Cameron would ultimately be brought down by his desire to listen to the will of the people when 
on the 23 June the UK voted to leave the EU. The leadership of Cameron will be associated with this 
decision and it has impacted the early premiership of Theresa May his successor. She has distanced 
herself from his premiership by removing key figures within the cabinet such as Osborne and replaced 
them with her allies. It is evident that the Conservative Party has abandoned its plans to modernise 
whilst it is in government and with a weak opposition it will interesting to see the changes the party 
will make, or if it will be like the premiership of Thatcher who led the Conservative to three 
consecutive victories in the 1980’s. These victories were based on liberal economics but Conservative 
social policies, ideas that Tony Judt argued were the responsibility of a state to protects a nations 
culture. He stated ‘We are obsessed with money and have lost any sense of community. In the 30 
years following the Second World War, there was a widespread belief that the state could do a better 
job than the unregulated market’225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
225 Judt, Tony. Ill Fares the Land. Newstatesman.com. (2010). 
74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
 
Primary Sources 
 
The House of Commons. “European Union (Referendum) Bill.” June 19, 2013. Accessed March 30, 
2017. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbills/2013-2014/0011/14011.pdf. 
 
A New Campaigning Landscape? n.p.: National Council for Voluntary Organisations, 2011. 
Http://socialwelfare.bl.uk/subject-areas/government 
issues/socialpolicy/novo/138159new_campaigning_landscape.pdf. 
 
BBC “First 100 Days: William Hague.” BBC UK Politics (BBC News), March 16, 2006. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4745016.stm. 
 
BBC “Conservative MP Defects to Labour.” BBC UK Politics (BBC News), June 27, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6241928.stm. 
 
BBC“Poll Watch: Review of 2007.” BBC UK Politics (BBC News), December 21, 2007. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7156241.stm. 
 
Bai, Matt. ‘Obama and the Question of ‘Triangulation’ -Website title: Nytimes.com. 2010. Accessed 
3rd January 2018.  
 
Cameron, David “Full Text: Cameron Speech on EU.” BBC UK Politics (BBC News), November 4, 
2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8343145.stm. 
 
BBC. “BBC News - Full Text: Conservative-Lib Dem Deal.” BBC UK election (BBC News), May 
12, 2010. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/election_2010/8677933.stm. 
75 
 
 
BBC “David Cameron Promises In/out Referendum on EU.” BBC UK Politics (BBC News), January 
23, 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21148282. 
 
BBC “Cameron Accused of ‘total failure’ on Immigration.” BBC UK Politics (BBC News), 
November 27, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-30224490. 
 
BBC “Tory MP Douglas Carswell Defects to UKIP and Forces by-Election.” BBC UK Politics (BBC 
News), August 28, 2014. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-28967904. 
BBC. ‘Tories leaving Europe's EPP group’ BBC UK Politics. March 2009. Accessed December 4th 
2017.: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7938482.stm  
 
BBC . “Conservative MP Sir Roger Gale: Gay Marriage Is ‘Orwellian.’” BBC UK Politics (BBC 
News), n.d. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-21344739. 
 
BBC. March 16, 2006. Accessed March 17, 2017. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ukpolitics/4745016.stm.  
 
Bbc.co.uk. (2018). BBC Politics 97. [online] Available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/special/politics97/leadership/lead95.shtml (Accessed 27th December 
2018) 
 
BRIEFING UK Public Opinion Toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern. n.p., 
2017. http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Briefing-
Public_Opinion_Immigration_Attitudes_Concern.pdf.  
 
British Future. “From Minority Vote to Majority Challenge.” Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://socialwelfare.bl.uk/subject-areas/services-client-
groups/minoritygroups/britishfuture/154731From-Minority-Vote-to-Majority-Challenge.pdf.  
 
Brunson, Michael. ‘Three in the Cabinet are Bastards’ 1993. ITN interview with John Major. 
 
Cameron, David. “David Cameron’s Immigration Speech.” March 25, 2013. Accessed March 30, 
2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/david-camerons-immigration-speech.  
 
Cameron, David. “Economy Speech Delivered by David Cameron.” March 7, 2013. Accessed March 
30, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/economy-speech-delivered-by-david-cameron.  
76 
 
 
Cameron, David. ‘Statement on Libya.’ 2011. Statement made before parliament. Broadcasted 5th 
September 2011. 
 
Cameron David’ Liberal Consensus’ December 31 2012. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.ukpol.co.uk/2015/12/31/david-cameron-2007-speech-on-liberal-consensus/. 
Cons 07 Manifesto. n.p., 2007.  
 
Cameron, David and Conservative Party. Invitation to Join the Government of Britain: The 
Conservative Manifesto 2010. United Kingdom: Conservative Research Department, 2010. 
 
Churchill. W. ‘The 1951 Conservative Manifesto.’ 1951. Accessed 30th November 2017. 
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1951/1951-conservative-manifesto.shtml  
 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/ass07/man/scot/cons_07_manifesto.pdf. 
 
The Independent - UK Politics. Conservative Party Conference 2012 in Birmingham: Full Transcript 
of David Cameron’s Speech. (Independent), January 10, 2013.  
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politicsConservative-party-conference-2012-in-birmingham-
full-transcript-of-david-camerons-speech-8205536.html. 
 
Doward, Jamie. Revealed: Tobacco Giants Secret Plans to See Off Plain Cigarette Packets. n.p., 2013. 
http://tobacco.cleartheair.org.hk/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/GuardianBigTCrosby.pdf. 
 
Farage, Nigel. “Our Future in Irish Hands | Nigel Farage.” The Guardian (The Guardian), February 
17, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/oct/02/irish-referendum-lisbon-treaty. 
 
 Parliament. "Factories Acts ". Hansard House of Commons Debates. March 1833. 
 
Gale, Roger. Interview with Sir Roger Gale. September 2015.  (personal notes). 
 
Green, C. (2018). Nicola Sturgeon has attacked the Tories over 'iniquitous' tax credit cuts. The 
Independent. 
 
Smith, Ian Ducan, “Full Text: Ian Duncan Smith’s Statement.” November 5, 2002. Accessed March 
30, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/nov/05/conservstives.uk3. 
 
77 
 
Government, Scottish, St Andrew’s House, Regent Road, and 0131 556 8400 ceu. “Agreement 
Between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government on the Referendum on 
Independence for Scotland.” September 21, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.gov.scot/About/Government/concordats/Referendum-on-independence. 
 
The Guardian. “Full Text: David Cameron’s Speech to the Conservative Conference 2005.” The 
Guardian (The Guardian), February 18, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2005/oct/04/conservatives2005.conservatives3. 
 
Smith, Ian Duncan “Full Text: Iain Duncan Smith’s Acceptance Speech.” The Guardian (The 
Guardian), February 18, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/sep/14/conservatives.uk1. 
 
Hague, William. “Hague: Party Conference Speech 2000:Conservative Party Speeches: SayIt.” 
October 5, 2000. Accessed March 30, 2017. http://conservative-
speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601191. 
 
Hague, William. ‘leaders conference speech full text’ Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.ukpol.co.uk/2015/11/27/william-hague-1998-conservative-party-conference-speech/  
 
Helm, Toby and Chief Political Correspondent. “Tories to Hike Inheritance Tax Threshold to £1m.” 
The Telegraph (Telegraph.co.uk), October 1, 2007. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1564767/Tories-to-hike-inheritance-tax-threshold-to-
1m.html. 
 
HM Government. The Coalition: Our Programme for Government. n.p., 2010. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78977/coalition_progra
mme_for_government.pdf.  
 
The Treasury. Budget 2012. 2012: accessed on 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/247119/1853.pdf  
 
House of Commons. “Fixed-Term Parliaments Bill.” September 9, 2010. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.publications.parliment.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmpolcon/436/436.pdf.  
 
House of Commons. “Alternative Vote Referendum 2011.” May 19, 2011. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliment.uk/documents/RP11-44/RP11-44.pdf. 
 
78 
 
ITV. “Miliband Says EU Referendum Is ’unLikely’ Under Labour.” March 12, 2014. Accessed March 
30, 2017. http://www.itv.com/news/2014-03-12/miliband-says-eu-referendum-is-unlikely-under-
labour/. 
 
Jackson, Kevin. ‘‘Beat this big society nonsense’ Unison. 2012 accessed December 27th 2017. 
https://www.unison.org.uk/news/article/2012/03/beat-this-big-society-nonsense/  
 
Leader. “Leader: Jungle Drums.” The Guardian (The Guardian), February 18, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/dec/17/conservatives.polls. 
 
LP, Cable News Network. “CNN.Com - Text of Bush’s Address - September 11, 2001.” CNN (CNN), 
2001. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/. 
 
Liptak, A. (2015). Supreme Court Ruling Makes Same-Sex Marriage a Right Nationwide. [online] 
Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/supreme-court-same-sex-
marriage.html [Accessed 10 december. 2017]. 
 
Lisbon-treaty.org. (2009). The Lisbon Treaty. [online] Available at: http://www.lisbon-
treaty.org/wcm/the-lisbon-treaty/ [Accessed 1 Jan. 2018]. 
 
Murphy, Joe. “David Cameron Blasted over Budget ‘omnishambles.’” Politics (Evening Standard), 
April 19, 2012. http://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/david-cameron-blasted-over-budget-
omnishambles-7661054.html.  
 
Osborne, George. “Chancellor on Building a Northern Powerhouse.” May 14, 2015. Accessed March 
30, 2017. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/chancellor-on-building-a-northern-powerhouse.  
 
The Financial Times. Osborne Hails “golden decade” in Sino-British Relations. 2015. 
https://www.ft.com/content/a40adeb4-a973-11e5-955c-1e1d6de94879. 
Marriage (same sex couples) act 2013, 2013. 
 
PoliticalStuff. “1987 Conservative Party Manifesto.” 2001. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1987/1987-conservative-manifesto.shtml.  
 
Politics 97. ‘Conservative Party Leadership Election 1995’ 1997. BBC online. Accessed 27th 
December 2017. 
 
79 
 
The Telegraph. ‘Put up or Shut up.’ (Telegraph.co.uk), October 23, 2003. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/telegraph-view/3597938/Put-up-or-shut-up.html.  
 
Reporters, Telegraph. “David Cameron Announces His Resignation - Full Statement.” The Telegraph 
(The Telegraph), June 24, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/david-cameron-
announces-his-resignation---full-statement/.  
 
Silvera, Ian. “Prime Minister’s Questions: Miliband Attacks Cameron over ‘broken’ Immigration 
Promise.” Politics (International Business Times UK), December 3, 2014. 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/prime-ministers-questions-miliband-attacks-cameron-over-broken-
immigration-promise-1477870. 
 
Smith, Iain Duncan. “The Security & Defence Policies of the Conservative Party.” The RUSI Journal 
146, no. 4 (August 2001): 44–49. doi:10.1080/03071840108446675. 
 
Statistics, Office For National. Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: November 2014. n.p.: Office 
For National Statistics, 2014.  
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigrati
on/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/2015-06-30.  
 
“Text of the Budget Statement - 26th November 1996.” 1996. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page4286.html. 
 
The Guardian (The Guardian), February 6, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jan/30/conservative-party-thatcher-cameron-bale. 
 
 
The Conservative Party. ‘THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY MANIFESTO 201 5,’ 2015. https://s3-eu-
west-1.amazonaws.com/manifesto2015/ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf.  
The Conservative Party (2001). Time for Common Sense: 2001 Conservative Party General Election 
Manifesto. London.. 
 
The Telegraph. Tuition Fees Rise Is ’sUstainable and Fair’, Says David Cameron. (Telegraph.co.uk), 
December 8, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/education/universityeducation/8189404/Tuition-fees-
rise-is-sustainable-and-fair-says-David-Cameron.html. 
 
80 
 
The Guardian, “Labour Overspending Did Not Trigger Financial Crash, Says Senior Civil Servant.” 
The Guardian February 17, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/03/senior-tory-
financial-crash-was-purely-a-banking-crisis-not-labour-overspend  
 
The Conservative Party “1997 Conservative Party Manifesto.” 2001. Accessed March 16, 2017. 
http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1997/1997-conservative-manifesto.shtml 
 
Sked, Alan. “UK Independence Party manifesto 1997.” Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://www.politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/ukip97.htm#preface. 
 
Wells, Antony. “UK Polling Report.” February 27, 2006. Accessed September, 2016. 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/date/2006/02 . 
 
Wells, Antony. “UK Polling Report.” July 31, 2006. Accessed September, 2016 
http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/date/2006/07. 
 
Wells, Antony. ‘Are the Conservatives any Closer to the Centre ground’ YouGov. 2006 
 
White, M. (1997). Blair's crushing triumph. [online] the Guardian. Available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1997/may/02/past.partyfunding [Accessed 1 Jan. 2018]. 
 
 
Wright, Oliver. “General Election TV Debates: How Each Leader Performed in the ITV Discussion.” 
The Independent - General Election 2015 (Independent), January 4, 2021. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/generalelection/general-election-tv-debates-how-
each-leader-performed-in-the-itv-discussion-10153535.html. 
 
Secondary Sources 
 
Alderman, K. (2002). The Conservative Party Leadership Election of 2001. Parliamentary Affairs, 
55(3), pp.569-585. 
 
Ashworth-Hayes, Sam and Amy Sippitt. “Have the Government’s Tuition Fee Reforms Worked?” 
July 21, 2015. Accessed March 30, 2017. https://fullfact.org/education/have-governments-tuition-fee-
reforms-worked/. 
 
81 
 
Bale, Tim. The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron. Cambridge: Wiley, John & Sons, 
2011. 
 
Beckford, Martin. “Nick Clegg Defends Liberal Democrat Stance on Europe.” The Telegraph 
(Telegraph.co.uk), April 18, 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/election-2010/7603945/Nick-
Clegg-defends-Liberal-Democrat-stance-on-Europe.html. 
 
Bew, John, Gabriel Elefteriu, Jon Holbrook, James Allan, Geoffrey Owen, Warwick Lightfoot, and 
Dean Godson. “The UK and the Western Alliance: NATO in the New Era of Realpolitik.” March 28, 
2017. Accessed January, 2017. https://www.policyexchange.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/compassionate-conservativism-june-06.pdf. 
 
blogger, Staff. “David Cameron, 2005.” February 4, 2010. Accessed February  2017. 
http://www.newstatesman.com/uk-politics/2010/02/david-cameron-speech-leadership.  
 
Bluth, Christoph. “The British Road to War: Blair, Bush and the Decision to Invade Iraq.” 
International Affairs 80, no. 5 (October 2004): 871–92. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2004.00423.x. 
 
Booth, Philip. “There Is No Such Thing as Society.” September 26, 2009. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
https://iea.org.uk/blog/there-is-no-such-thing-as-society. 
 
Bourne, Ryan. “To Create Growth, Taxes and Government Spending Must Be Radically Cut.” 
November 8, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. https://iea.org.uk/to-create-growth-taxes-and-
government-spending-must-be-radically-cut/. 
 
Brown, C. (2007). Conservatives hit back at Tebbit's criticism of Cameron leadership’. The 
Independant. 
 
Clarke, M (1988) ‘The policy-making process’ inMSmith, S Smith and B White (eds) British 
foreign policy: tradition, change and transformation (London: Hyman), 71–95  
 
Daddow, Oliver and Pauline Schnapper. “Liberal Intervention in the Foreign Policy Thinking of Tony 
Blair and David Cameron.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 2 (June 2013): 330–
49. doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.737763.  
 
Dathan, Matt. “David Cameron Announces New Crackdown on Non-EU Immigration.” The 
Independent - UK Politics (Independent), January 6, 2012. 
82 
 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-cameron-announces-new-crackdown-on-non-
eu-immigrants-10310192.html. 
 
 Cameron David, “David Cameron Resigns After U.K. Votes to Leave European Union.” June 24, 
2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/24/david-cameron-
resigna-after-uk-votes-to-leave-european-union. 
 
 Cameron, David “David Cameron: Speech to Conservative Party Conference 2014.” October 1, 2014. 
Accessed March 30, 2017. http://press.conservatives.com/post/98882674910/david-cameron-speech-
to-conservative-party. 
 
Cameron David “David Cameron: The Big Society:Conservative Party Speeches: SayIt.” November 
10, 2009. Accessed March 30, 2017. http://conservative-speeches.sayit.mysociety.org/speech/601246.  
 
Cameron, David  “David Cameron’s Conservative Party Conference Speech in Full.” The Guardian 
(The Guardian), February 17, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/05/david-
cameron-conservative-party-speech. 
 
Cameron David . “David Cameron Announces His Resignation - Full Statement.” The Telegraph (The 
Telegraph), June 24, 2016. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/24/david-cameron-announces-
his-resignation---full-statement/.  
 
Chilcot, John. ‘Statement by Sir John Chilcot:’ 6 July 2016. n.p., 2016. 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/247010/2016-09-06-sir-john-chilcots-public-statement.pdf  
 
Clarke, Kenneth “Text of the Budget Statement - 26th November 1996.” 1996. Accessed March 16, 
2017. http://www.johnmajor.co.uk/page4286.html.  
 
Davis, A. (2010). Political communication and social theory. London: Routledge. 
 
Dennison, James and Matthew Goodwin. “Immigration, Issue Ownership and the Rise of UKIP.” 
Parliamentary Affairs 68, no. suppl_1 (September 1, 2015): 168–87. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
doi:10.1093/pa/gsv034. http://pa.oxfordjournals.org/content/68/suppl_1/168.full.pdf+html. 
 
Department of Health. “Statistics on NHS Hospital Activity.” June 2012. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
https://www.statisticauthority.gov.uk/wp-contect/uploads/2015/12/images-
assessmentreport228statisticsonnhshospitalactivit_tem97-41983.pdf.  
83 
 
 
Dinan , Will. “Fattened Pigs, Dog Whistles and Dead Cats: The Menagerie of a Linton Crosby 
Campaign.” June 16, 2016. Accessed March 30, 2017. http://theconversation.com/fattened-pigs-dog-
whistles-and-dead-cats-the-menagerie-of-a-lynton-crosby-campaign-60695.  
 
Dodds, Klaus and Stuart Elden. “Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and 
British Neo-Conservatism.” British Journal of Politics & International Relations 10, no. 3 (August 
2008): 347–63. doi:10.1111/j.1467-856x.2008.00327.x. 
 
Dymond, Jonny. “Election Result: How David Cameron’s Conservatives Won It.” BBC Election 2015 
(BBC News), May 8, 2015. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2015-32661502. 
 
Edited, Timothy Heppell. Leaders of the Opposition: From Churchill to Cameron. Edited by Timothy 
Heppell. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Lee, Simon. “How Has the UK’s Coalition Government Performed?” 2015. Accessed March 30, 
2017. https://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/how-has-uks-coalition-government-performed.  
 
McEnhill L “Radicalism or Retreat? The Conservative Party Under Cameron.” 2015. Accessed March 
30, 2017. http://www.psa.ac.uk/insight-plus/radicalism-or-retreat-conservative-party-under-cameron.  
 
Green, E. H. H. H H. The Crisis of Conservatism: The Politics, Economics, and Ideology of the 
British Conservative Party, 1880-1914. London: Routledge, 1996. 
 
Hamilton, Andy. “Conservatism.” August 1, 2015. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conservatism/. 
 
Hayton, R. (2012). Reconstructing conservatism?. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 2012.  
 
Heppell, Timothy and David Seawright, eds. Cameron and the Conservatives: The Transition to 
Coalition Government. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 
 
Heppell, T. (2008). Choosing the Tory leader. London: Tauris Academic Studies.  
 
Hill, M. (2007). The Parliamentary Conservative Party. University of Huddersfield. 
 
84 
 
Hix, Simon. What’s Wrong with the European Union and How to Fix It. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2008. 
 
“How Cameron Won... And Davis Lost.” December 7, 2005. 
http://conservativehome.blogs.com/toryleadership/2005/12/how_cameron_won.html. 
Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity. ‘How Has Ethnic Diversity Grown, 1991 2001 2011’. n.p., 2012. 
http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/medialibrary/briefings/dynamicsofdiversity/how-has-ethnic-diversity-
grown-1991-2001-2011.pdf.  
 
Jenkins, Simon. “The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron by Tim Bale | Book Review.”  
 
Johnson, Boris. The Essential: Lend Me Your Ears. London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2003  
 
Newstatesman.com. (2018). Ill Fares the Land. [online] Available at: 
https://www.newstatesman.com/books/2010/04/judt-state-sense-public-social [Accessed 5 Jan. 2018]. 
 
Kelly, Richard. “Conservatism Under Hague: The Fatal Dilemma.” The Political Quarterly 72, no. 2 
(April 2001): 197–203. doi:10.1111/1467-923x.00358.   
 
Lawson, Nigel. Memoirs of a Tory Radical. London: Biteback Publishing, 2010. 
 
 
Lilleker, Darren G., Nigel A. Jackson, and Richard Scullion. The Marketing of Political Parties: 
Political Marketing at the 2005 General Election. n.p.: Manchester University Press, 2006. 
https://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=n-
KXiE4WMekC&oi=fnd&pg=PA132&dq=failures+of+lynton+crosby&ots=RcU_v6-
w24&sig=hXH8Ggo4rhWLlV4pixQ71wPmOt0#v=onepage&q=crosby&f=false.  
 
“Lyndon Crosby Is Right about the ‘politics of fear.’” 2013. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
https://www.ft.com/content/6b107dc4-5fae-11e5-a28b-50226830d644.  
 
Major, John. John Major: The Autobiography. London: HarperCollins Publishers, 2000. 
 
Martin, Ron, Andy Pike, Pete Tyler, and Ben Gardiner. ‘Spatially rebalancing the UK Economy: The 
need for a new policy model’. n.p., 2015. 
http://www.regionalstudies.org/uploads/documents/SRTUKE_v16_PRINT.pdf.  
 
85 
 
McSmith, Andy. “Cameron’s Big Society Attacked as ‘a cover for spending cuts.’” The Independent - 
UK Politics (Independent), January 7, 2013. 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/camerons-big-society-attacked-as-a_cover-for-
spending-cuts-2030334.html.  
 
Murrell , Peter. Conservative Political Philosophy and the Strategy of Economic Transition . n.p., 
1992. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABK736.pdf. 
Olasky, Marvin N. Compassionate Conservatism: What It Is, What It Does, and How It Can 
Transform America. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 2000. 
 
Osborne, Peter. “It’s Time to Give John Major the Credit We so Cruelly Denied Him.” The Telegraph 
(Telegraph.co.uk), April 4, 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/conservative/9185917/Its-
time-to-give-John-Major-the-credit-we-so-cruelly-denied-him.html.  
 
Oliver, Tim. International Affairs 91, no. 1 (2014): 1. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6eb8/0229610049d0c9836ea6b7f07b6d5abc9196.pdf.  
 
Pantazis, C., Gordon, D. and Levitas, R. (2006). Poverty and social exclusion in Britain. Bristol: The 
Policy Press. 
 
Pierce, Andrew. “European Elections 2009: David Cameron’s Victory Tempered by Ukip Surge.” The 
Telegraph (Telegraph.co.uk), June 8, 2009. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5477309/European-elections-2009-David-
Camerons-victory-tempered-by-Ukip-surge.html.  
 
Pugh, Martin. State and Society Fourth Edition: A Social and Political History of Britain Since 1870. 
4th ed. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012. 
 
Quinn, Thomas, Judith Bara, and John Bartle. “The UK Coalition Agreement of 2010: Who Won?” 
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion & Parties 21, no. 2 (2011): 295–312. Accessed March 30, 2017. 
doi:10.1080/17457289.2011.562610. 
http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~tquinn/Quinn_Coalition_Agreement_JEPOP_2011.pdf.  
 
Rutter, Michael. Much to Be Done to Improve the Mental Health of Young People. 370, no. 9588 
(2017): 647–48. Accessed March 30, 2017. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(07)61323-3. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0140673607613233.  
 
86 
 
Seawright, David. “‘On A low road’: The 2005 Conservative Campaign.” Journal of Marketing 
Management 21, no. 9-10 (November 2005): 943–57. doi:10.1362/026725705775194120.  
 
Seldon, Anthony and Peter Snowdon. Cameron at 10: The Inside Story 2010-2015. London: William 
Collins, 2015. 
 
Seldon, Anthony, Peter Snowdon, and Daniel Collings. Blair Unbound. London: Simon & Schuster 
UK, 2008. 
 
Sopel, Jon. Tony Blair: The Moderniser. London: Michael Joseph, 1995. 
 
Smith, Martin. “Margaret Thatcher’s Rejection of Consensus Was Symptomatic of an Anti-
Democratic Tendency in a Political System Dominated by the Exclusive.” April 25, 2013. Accessed 
March 30, 2017. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/margaret-thatcher-and-the-rejection-of-
consensus-a-rejection-of-democracy. .  
 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. ‘Conservatism’ August 1, 2015. Accessed March 17, 2017. 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entires/conservatism/.  
 
The Centre for Social Justice. “Breakdown Britain: Education Failure.” December 14, 2006. Accessed 
March 30, 2017. http://www.centreforsocialjustice.ord.uk/library/breakdown-britian-educational-
failure.  
 
 
Vinen, Richard. Thatcher’s Britain: The Politics and Social Upheaval of the Thatcher Era. London: 
Simon & Schuster UK, 2010. 
 
Watt, Nicholas. “The Linton Crosby Effect:Dog Whistles and Jewellery Jokes.” September 29, 2013. 
Accessed November , 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/sept/29/lynton-crosby. 
 
White, Michael. “British PM David Cameron Confounds Polls to Win Second Term.” The Guardian 
(The Guardian), March 8 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/may/08/british-pm-david-
cameron-confounds-polls-to-win-second-term.  
 
Whitehead, Tom and Home Affairs. “European Elections 2009: Ukip Claims Political Breakthrough.” 
The Telegraph (Telegraph.co.uk), June 8, 2009. 
87 
 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/5478468/European-elections-2009-Ukip-
claims-political-breakthrough.html.  
 
Wintour, Patrick. “Clegg: AV Is a Simple Change That Will Make a Big Difference.” The Guardian 
(The Guardian), February 18, 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/18/nick-clegg-
alternative-vote-change.  
. 
Wintour, Patrick and Stephen Bates. “Major Goes Back to the Old Values.” The Guardian (The 
Guardian), February 18, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/1993/oct/09/conservatives.past. 
 
Wyke, M. (2008). Julius Caesar in Western Culture. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons. 
 
Young, Ross. ‘Local Elections in England’: 2 May 2002’. London: House of Commons Library. 
 
 
